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The world, I think, can be divided into 2 kinds of people: .. .those who 
think the Internet and the new communications technologies herald a 
revolution calling for radical rethinking of our basic notions of law and 
politics and society, and those who think it does not, that it is simply more 
of the same, an incremental change in the way human interaction 
proceeds.1
INTRODUCTION
The epigraph suggests a dichotomy that makes categorization simple -  those who 
accept that Internet and new communication technologies present changes “in kind” 
which necessitate abandonment of “old” ways of thinking about law, politics, and 
society, and those who deny this new reality and seek to treat it merely as 
incremental change. Those in the latter group are not infrequently portrayed as 
luddites, unwilling and unable to accept that technology necessitates rethinking 
everything from the ground up. Through the exploration of the impact of emerging 
technologies on child pornography, I suggest that this dichotomy is more fictional 
than real; technological developments can facilitate both transformative and 
incremental change. Perhaps more importantly, I suggest that transformations 
brought about by technology need not compel us in every instance to abandon old 
ways o f thinking. These transformations may actually reaffirm the significance of 
previously made commitments and values that have been under-recognized in 
examinations of the justification for existing laws. In so doing, these transformations 
offer us not only the opportunity to get clearer about our values and commitments, 
but to explore new justifications for “old” ways of thinking that did not previously 
exist, were ignored, or were once considered weak.
It is a crime in Canada to participate in many facets of the child pornography 
industry, from possessing and knowingly accessing child pornography through to
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1 David G. Post, “The Cyberspace Revolution” (Keynote Address, Computer Policy & Law Conference, 
Cornell University, July 1997) [unpublished] online: Temple University <http://www.temple. 
edu/lawschool/dpost/Comell.html>.
manufacturing and distributing it.2 Criminal prohibitions apply whether the material 
in question derives solely from the imagination, involving no “real” children in its 
production, or actually depicts “real” children.3 With certain limited exceptions, it is 
equally illegal to photograph the sexual abuse of a child, to write a story advocating 
sexual activity with an “imaginary” child, to photograph an adult posing as a child 
engaged in explicit sexual activity, and to draw pictures showing “imaginary” 
children in explicit sexual activity.4 Criminal restrictions on the latter examples 
relating solely to stories and depictions of imaginary children are characterized as 
“virtual child pornography” for the purposes of this paper.
The Criminal Code (Code) provisions relating to child pornography have been 
the object of considerable academic, NGO, and judicial commentary and criticism, as 
well as political debate.5 Technological innovation, in particular the Internet, 
renewed and perhaps intensified the debate prompting calls for international action, 
legislative reform, and academic comment. Much of the debate focuses on 
technology’s impact on the “scope” of the problem of child pornography and its
2 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1 as am. by S.C. 1993, c. 46, s. 2 [Code],
3 Visual material depicting children engaged in explicit sexual activity is caught, as is material featuring 
as a dominant characteristic the sexual organ or anal region of a child for a sexual purpose. The 
proscription also applies to the depiction of both real and imaginary persons. R. v. Sharpe, [20011 1 
S.C.R. 45 at para. 72 [Sharpe].
4 The Supreme Court of Canada outlined two exceptions relating to personal use in Sharpe, ibid., which 
are discussed in detail below in Part II. “Child” for the purposes o f the Code, supra note 2, s. 163.1(1), 
relates to persons under the age of 18.
5 See e.g. Bruce Ryder, “The Harms of Child Pornography Law” (2003) 36 U.B.C.L. Rev. 101 (QL) 
[Ryder]; Lise Gotell, “Inverting Image and Reality: R. v. Sharpe and the Moral Panic Around Child 
Pornography” (2001/2002) 12 Const. Forum 9; Amy Adler, “Inverting the First Amendment” (2001) 
149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921; Amy Adler, “The Perverse Law of Child Pornography” (2001) 101 Colum. L. 
Rev. 209; Janine Benedet, “Children in Pornography after Sharpe” (2002) 43 C. de D. 327; and 
Sanjeev Anand, “A Case for Upholding the Child Pornography Law” (1999) 25 C.R. (5th) 312; See 
e.g. John D. McAlpine et al., “Factum of the Intervener, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association” 
(30 December 1999), online: BCCLA Factum: R v. Sharpe in the Supreme Court o f Canada 
<http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/sharpescc.html>; Letter from A. Alan Borovoy to The Hon. 
Marion Boyd (7 January 1994), online: CCLA Positions <http://www.ccla.org/pos/letters/aglanger. 
shtml>; Canadian Conference of the Arts, “Canadian Conference of the Arts’ Backgrounder on Bill C- 
2” (4 April 2005), online: Backgrounder on Bill C-2 <http://www.ccarts.ca/en/advocacy/publications/ 
policy/cl2backgrounder.htm>; Christopher Waddell, “National Affairs Committee Report”, in PEN 
Canada 2002-2003 Annual Report, online: AnnualReport02-03.pdf <http://www.pencanada.ca 
/media/AnnualReport02-03.pdf> at 33; Writers’ Union of Canada, “Submission of the Writers' Union 
of Canada, League of Canadian Poets, Periodical Writers Association of Canada, and Playwrights 
Guild of Canada to the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness on Bill C-2” (31 March 2005), online: justice.pdf <http://www.writersunion.ca 
/justice.pdf>; Letter from David Matas to the House o f Commons Justice Committee on Bill C-20 (7 
October 2003), online: Beyond Borders <http://www.beyondborders.org/p8.shtml>; In striking down 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act o f 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256(8)(B), 2256(8)(D) (1996) [CPPA], 
which prohibited, among other things, possession of “virtual child pornography”, the United States 
Supreme Court (USSC) stated: “In contrast to...speech that itself is the record of sexual abuse, the 
CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children”. Ashcroft v. The Free Speech 
Coalition 535 U.S. 234 (2002) at 250 [Ashcroft], The arduous path of promulgation and amendment 
of the Code provisions relating to child pornography is discussed in detail in Part I below.
increased accessibility.6 Somewhat less attention has been paid to the potentially 
transformative aspects of these technologies and their impact on foundational issues, 
such as the justifications for regulating child pornography which bring into stark 
relief the significance of its broader collective harms.
The “old” way for thinking about the justification for restrictions such as these 
was outlined in the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) landmark decision on the 
constitutionality of the provision as it stood in 1992 in Sharpe.1 The SCC referred in 
its reasons to the objectives of preventing harm to children, including allusions to 
their rights to dignity, privacy and bodily integrity.8 However, its analysis of harms 
was premised first and foremost on the risk of physical harm to individual children 
associated with the creation and consumption of both virtual and non-virtual child 
pornography.
This paper urges further reflection on the understanding of the harms of child 
pornography identified by the SCC in an attempt to get clearer about the rights and 
interests at stake, while grappling with the impact of related technological advances. 
I argue that the impact of the Internet and related digital technologies is not simply 
incremental, but also transformative. Emerging technologies blur the line between 
conscience, expression and action in ways that cry out for an understanding of the 
harms of child pornography encompassing not just the extremely concerning 
physical harm to individual children, but also broader social harms to children’s 
collective dignity and equality rights.
Part I is an examination of the legal history leading to and connecting prior 
child pornography legislation with recently enacted amendments, including two key 
cases involving virtual child pornography in the offline context -  Sharpe and 
Langer.9 Part II examines the harms analysis accepted by the SCC in Sharpe, 
assessing in particular its emphasis on individuated physical harm, which has 
subsequently been repeated in other cases. Part III explores the ways in which the 
Internet and related technological advances have presented incremental challenges to 
the enforcement and prosecution of child pornography laws. It then considers 
technologically-initiated transformative change that leads to an understanding of 
harms focusing not only upon physical harm to individual children, but also broader 
collective harms to children’s equality.
6 See e.g. Max Taylor, “The Nature and Dimensions of Child Pornography on the Internet” (Paper 
presented to the International Conference on Combating Child Pornography on the Internet, 1 June
2002) [unpublished], online: The nature and dimensions of child pornography on the Internet 
<http://www.ipce.infb/library_3/files/nat_dims_kp.htm> [Taylor, “Nature and Dimensions”]; Benedet, 
supra note 5 at 332; Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor, “Child Pornography and the Internet: Perpetuating a 
Cycle of Abuse” (2002) 23 Deviant Behavior 331 at 356-57 [Quayle & Taylor, “Child Pornography 
and the Internet”]; and Donna M. Hughes, “The Use of New Communication and Information 
Technologies for the Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children” (2002) 13 Hastings Women’s L. J. 
129, online: new_tech.pdf <http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/new_tech.pdf> [Hughes, “Sexual 
Exploitation”].
7 Sharpe, supra note 3.
8 Ibid. at paras. 28, 92 (McLachlin C.J.C.), 158, 164 (L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, and Bastarache JJ.).
9 Sharpe, ibid.; Re Paintings, Drawings and Photographic Slides [by Eli Langer], [1995] OJ. No. 1045 
at paras. 13-15 (QL) [Langer].
PART I -  CANADA’S CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROVISIONS
The criminalization o f acts relating to child pornography in Canada has followed a 
long and somewhat arduous path, reacting and responding to international 
obligations undertaken by Canada in relation to the rights of children, as well as 
constitutional challenges and judicial interpretations that have spurred legislative 
action.
1. Leading to Sharpe - Events of the 1990’s
In 1991, Canada ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).10 The 
CRC required signatory nations to, among other things, take all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to protect those under 
the age of 18 from all forms of violence (including sexual abuse) as well as 
economic and sexual exploitation (including participation in pornographic 
performances and materials).11 While courts have relied on these obligations in 
interpreting domestic legislation affecting the rights and well-being of children, 
Canada has not transformed many of its CRC obligations into domestic law.12
Until 1993, child pornography in Canada was dealt with under the obscenity 
provision of the Criminal Code, the constitutionality of which the SCC upheld in 
Butler.13 The Court found that, having regard for community standards of tolerance 
with respect to the risk of harm pornography poses to women and children, the 
following were permissibly restricted unless their portrayal was shown to be 
“essential to a wider artistic, literary, or other similar purpose”:
(i) sex coupled with violence; and
(ii) explicit sex which is degrading or dehumanizing if the risk of harm is 
substantial.14
At the same time, the SCC held that explicit sex which is not violent, 
dehumanizing, or degrading is generally within community standards, “unless it
10 Convention on the Rights o f the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448, GA Res. 
44/25, 44 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 49, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989) 166 (entered into force 2 September 
1990, accession by Canada 13 December 1991).
11 Ibid., art. 1,19; Ibid., art. 32; Ibid., art. 34.
12 See e.g. Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras. 70-71. Nonetheless, the SCC recently upheld 
the constitutionality of the “corporal punishment” provision of the Code, which permits parents and 
children to use “reasonable force” by way of “correction” of the children in their care. Canadian 
Foundation fo r Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 [Foundation 
fo r  Children, Youth and the Law]; For accounts o f other serious and growing socio-economic issues 
concerning children that remain unaddressed, see Ryder, supra note 5 at para. 35; Gotell, supra note 5 
at 12; Campaign 2000, “Decision Time for Canada: Let’s Make Poverty History ‘2005 Report Card On 
Child Poverty in Canada’ (2005), online: 05NationalReportCard.pdf <http://www.campaign2000.ca 
/rc/rc05/05NationalReportCard.pdf> at 1; and Stephen Gaetz, “Safe Streets for Whom? Homeless 
Youth, Social Exclusion, and Criminal Victimization” (2004) 46 Cdn. J. Criminology & Criminal 
Justice at 423.
13 Code, supra note 2; R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (QL) [Butler],
14 Butler, ibid. at paras. 60, 62.
employs children in its production.” 15 The Court’s analysis focused not only on 
individuated physical harms associated with the production and consumption of 
obscenity, but also its broader affront to equality. Sopinka J., for the majority, 
accepted that the effects of obscenity could alter attitudes toward women and 
children, undermining their place in the community just as hate propaganda can alter 
attitudes toward members of targeted groups. The majority cited with approval the 
following passage from Dickson C.J.C.’s reasons in the hate propaganda context:
[T]he alteration o f attitudes held by the recipients o f hate propaganda may 
occur subtly, and is not always attendant upon conscious acceptance o f the 
communicated ideas. Even if  the message o f hate propaganda is rejected, 
there is evidence that its premise o f  racial or religious inferiority may 
persist in a recipient’s mind as an idea that holds some truth, an incipient 
effect not to be entirely discounted.. . 16
In June 1993, Parliament added s. 163.1 to the Code, which specifically 
addresses child pornography.17 In addition to criminalizing the making, printing, 
publishing, distributing, and circulating of child pornography (which were the 
restricted acts with respect to obscenity pursuant to s. 163), s. 163.1 criminalized 
possession for the purposes of publication, distribution, or sale, as well as simple 
possession of child pornography.18
“Child pornography” included both visual representations depicting or 
advocating sexual activity with persons under 18, and certain depictions of the sex 
organs or anal region of a person under 18, in addition to written materials 
advocating or counselling sexual activity with a person under 18.19 The three 
statutory defences included: (i) artistic merit or an educational, scientific, or medical 
purpose; (ii) serving the public good, and (iii) an honest though mistaken belief that 
the persons depicted were over 18.20
Over the course of the next several years, the provisions were the focus of 
significant police investigation, yielding numerous prosecutions.21 Langer and 
Sharpe, two of the more high profile and controversial prosecutions, related (at least 
in part) to virtual child pornography in the “offline” context.22 Sharpe eventually
15 Ibid. at para. 60.
16 Ibid. at para. 74, citing R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 at 747-48, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1 [Keegstra 
cited to S.C.R.].
17 The Code, supra note 2, s. 163.1.
18 Ibid.,ss. 163.1(2)-(4).
19 Ibid., ss. 163.1( 1 )(a)(i)-(ii), (b); Ibid., s. 163.1(l)(b).
20 Ibid., s. 163.1(6); Ibid., s. 163.1(7); Ibid., s. 163.1(5).
21 Nationwide, “[b]etween 1997 and 2002, police laid charges against 226 men and 11 women for 
production or distribution of child pornography.” Rebecca Kong et al., “Sexual Offences in Canada” 
(2003) 23:6 Juristat 1 at 10, online: 0060385-002-XIE.pdf <http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca 
/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE/0060385-002-XIE.pdf>.
22 “Offline” is used here to refer to materials that were not in any way communicated via or stored on 
computer networks at the time of prosecution.
made its way to the SCC and represents the Court’s latest commentary on the 
constitutionality of restricting child pornography.
(A) Langer
On 20 April 1995, McCombs J. of the Ontario Court (General Division, as it then 
was) dismissed a Crown application under s. 164 of the Code for forfeiture of five 
large oil paintings and thirty-five small pencil drawings by artist Eli Langer, which 
depicted children involved in various sexual activities, some of which included 
adults.23 McCombs J. accepted the Crown’s evidence that child pornography (even 
that involving no real children in its making) could pose a risk of harm to children, 
insofar as it might be used to fuel the fantasies of pedophiles and reinforce their 
cognitive distortions, and to “groom” children to facilitate their sexual exploitation.24 
In dismissing the application, McCombs J. found that the images in issue posed no 
realistic risk of harm to children.
In response to the defence’s facial constitutional challenge to s. 163.1, 
McCombs J. found that the provision justifiably restricted an accused’s Charter right 
to freedom of expression, given the risk of harm child pornography poses to children 
and the tailoring of the provision (e.g. the defence of artistic merit). Rejecting the 
overbreadth argument advanced by the respondent, he noted that “[i]n an age of 
technical breakthroughs such as computer imaging, child pornography legislation 
should not be limited to images created through the use of real children.”26 
Nevertheless, he concluded that the materials in issue before him had artistic merit 
and did not fall below the community standard of tolerance in terms of the risk of 
harm to children, thus requiring their return to Langer.27
(B) Sharpe
Six years later in Sharpe, the SCC upheld the constitutionality of the s. 163.1 
possession offence.28 However, the majority read out two applications of the 
possession provision, which it found could not be justified under s. 1 of the 
Charter.29 The majority concluded that: (i) self-created, exclusively privately held 
works of the imagination; and (ii) “privately created visual recordings of lawful 
sexual activity made by or depicting the person in possession and intended only for 
private use” constituted unjustifiable infringements on freedom of expression and 
therefore should be read out of the provision’s ambit.30
23 Langer, supra note 9 at paras. 13-15.
24 Ibid. at paras. 26-29.
25 Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, Part I o f the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 2(b) [Charter]; Langer, supra note 9 at para. 135.
26 Langer, ibid. at para. 124.
27 Ibid. at paras. 172-75.
28 Sharpe, supra note 3.
29 Charter, supra note 25, s. 1.
30 Sharpe, supra note 3 at paras. 75-76.
While the Court acknowledged that the provision applied to depictions of both 
real and imaginary persons, it held that the prohibition on possession of the materials 
defined in s. 163.1(1) was justified in order to prevent harm to children. The Court 
accepted that the main purpose behind the child pornography law was to “prevent 
harm to children by banning the production, distribution and possession of child 
pornography, and by sending a message to Canadians ‘that children need to be 
protected from the harmful effects of child sexual abuse and exploitation and are not 
appropriate sexual partners’.”31
The Court found that, apart from the two exceptions identified, the child 
pornography provisions were tailored to catch only material posing a “reasoned risk” 
o f harm to children.32 The Court concluded that the provision addressed four harms 
associated with child pornography, which are discussed in detail in Part II below.
2. Events Following Sharpe -  National and International Focus on Technology
A series of Internet and technology-related events coalescing around the time o f the 
release of the SCC’s decision in Sharpe shifted significant global attention to the 
topic of child pornography.
The Government announced in its Speech from the Throne on 31 January 2001 
that it would “focus on safeguarding Canadians from new and emerging forms of 
crime...[by, among other things, acting to] safeguard children from crime, including 
criminals on the Internet...[and taking] steps to ensure that our laws protect children 
from those who would prey on their vulnerability.”33
Later that year, Canadian police forces announced “Project Snowball”, a 
national operation to crackdown on online child pornography.34 In tandem with this 
development, the Integrated Child Exploitation Unit was created in an effort to 
coordinate nationwide investigations relating to online child pornography.35 Since 
that time, specialized police units have arisen in jurisdictions across the country and
31 Ibid. at para. 34 (citing the House o f Commons Debates, 16 (3 June 1993) at 20328).
32 Ibid. at para. 35.
33 Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the 37th Parliament of 
Canada” (30 January 2001), online: Information Resources <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp? 
Language=E&Page=InformationResources&sub=sftddt&doc=sftddt2001_e.htm>.
34 Creation of Snowball followed the raid of a Dallas home that led to disclosure of the names of some 
300,000 subscribers to an online pornography website from 60 countries (including 2329 Canadians). 
“The Landslide Case” The Fifth Estate (5 November 2003), online: CBC News: the fifth estate: 
Landslide <http://www.cbc.ca/fiflh/landslide/case.html> [CBC, “Landslide”]. The investigation and 
prosecution of these offences in the United Kingdom generated significant media attention, particularly 
in relation to suicides by a number of accused men prior to their trials. In Ontario, the Ontario 
Provincial Police received 267 names of potential suspects; they arrested 32 and 30 were convicted. 
Toronto Police Services arrested 22 people from a list o f 241 potential suspects; 18 of the 22 arrested 
were convicted following a guilty plea. “Global child pom probe led to false accusations” CBC News 
(14 March 2006), online: Global child pom probe led to false accusations <www.cbc.ca/story/world 
/national/2006/03/ 14/landslide-pom060314.html> [CBC News, “False accusations”].
35 Alex Reid, “Child Pom List Counts 82 Manitobans” New Winnipeg (17 January 2003).
focus has shifted toward Internet training and investigation, along with further 
international cooperative investigations.36
In the fall of 2001, Canada undertook a number of related international 
obligations. On 10 November 2001, it signed the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography (Optional Protocol).37 The Optional Protocol requires signatories 
to ensure that, among other things, their criminal law covers producing, distributing, 
disseminating, importing, exporting, offering, selling, or possessing “any 
representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit 
sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily 
sexual purposes.”38
Only days later, Canada signed the European Union’s Cybercrime Convention, 
which requires signatories to address a number of substantive and procedural legal 
issues aimed at the need for “increased, rapid and well-functioning international 
cooperation” in cybercrime related matters.39 Signatories are to put in place 
adequate legislative measures to deal with four categories of online activities, 
including child pornography.40 Article 9 requires criminalization of production for 
purposes of distribution, offering or making available, as well as distributing, 
transmitting, procuring, and possessing child pornography in a computer system 
and/or a computer-data storage medium.41 It defines child pornography to include
36 For example, the Toronto Police Force developed a child pornography unit, as did the Ontario 
Provincial Police. Parliamentarians were apprised of these and other developments during the debate 
surrounding Bill C-l 5 A, which is discussed in further detail below, House o f Commons Debates, 174 (23 
April 2002) at 1005, 1010 (Larry Spencer). Legal authorities and certain Canadian ISPs are also working 
together with Cybertip.ca (Canada’s national tip line for reporting instances of child pornography and child 
sexual exploitation) to reduce Canadian access to online child pornography housed on servers outside of 
Canada through an initiative announced in late 2006 entitled Project Cleanfeed Canada: “Project Cleanfeed 
Canada: Frequently Asked Questions” Cybertip.ca, online: Childfmd/Cybertip <http://www.cybertip.ca 
/en/cybertip/cf_faq>.
37 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child on the sale o f children, child 
prostitution and child pornography, 25 May 2000, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/54/263
(2000) (entered into force on 18 January 2002) [Optional Protocol]. Four years later, on September 14,
2005, Canada ratified the Optional Protocol, see Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Canada 
Ratifies UN Optional Protocol Against the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (14 September 2005), online: Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade Canada <http://w01.intemational.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.asp? 
Language=E&publication_id=383023&docnumber=163>.
38 Optional Protocol, ibid., art. 2(c), 3(c).
39 Cybercrime Convention, 23 November 2001, Eur. T.S. No. 185 (entered into force 1 July 2004), 
online: Council of Europe_<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm>, Preamble, 
[Cybercrime Convention]. In Canada, the procedure-related provisions o f the Cybercrime Convention 
have been the subject of the Lawful Access Consultation, which has attracted important privacy- 
related concerns. See “Canadian government proposals for updating criminal laws and facilitating law 
enforcement in the electronic age” Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) (15 
November 2005), online: Lawful Access - CIPPIC <http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/lawfiil- 
access/> [CIPPIC, “Lawful Access”].
40 The other three categories are: (i) offences against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
computer data and systems; (ii) certain computer-related offences (e.g. forgery and fraud); and (iii) 
offences relating to copyright and related rights (Cybercrime Convention, ibid., art. 2-10).
41 Ibid., art. 9(1).
material showing a minor or someone appearing to be a minor engaged in, or 
appearing to engage in, sexually explicit conduct.42 Although the Convention 
defines “minor” as a person under 18 and covers both virtual and non-virtual child 
pornography, it specifically recognizes the right of signatories to lower the age to 16 
and to reserve against application of the provisions relating to virtual child 
pornography.43
On 26 March 2002, in the midst of numerous initiatives and consultations 
arising from the Cybercrime Convention and G8 strategy sessions, John Robin 
Sharpe was convicted of two counts of possession of child pornography following 
the retrial ordered by the SCC.44 It was Sharpe’s acquittal on two other counts of 
possession for purposes of distribution that once again led his case to become a 
lightning rod for controversy and calls for legislative reform.45
While numerous private members’ and government bills relating to reform of 
child pornography laws were proposed in 2001 and 2002, ultimately Bill C-15A 
received royal assent in June 2002 (2002 Amendment).46 In addition to facilitating
42 Ibid., art. 9(2).
43 Ibid., art. 9(3); Ibid., art. 9(4). The Cybercrime Convention came into force on 1 July 2004. As of 25 
April 2005, 38 EU member states had signed the Convention, and 10 of those had ratified it. 
“Simplified Chart of Signatures and Ratifications” Council o f  Europe (25 April 2005), online: 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?MA=49&CM=16&CL=ENG>. 
Five member states made express declarations, o f which only one -  Hungary -  expressly reserved 
against criminalizing visual depictions of a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct.
44 For example, in connection with its Cybercrime Convention obligations, Canada launched its lawful 
access consultation (relating to procedural and investigative powers) in 2002, with another round of 
consultation in 2003 and a more confined third round in 2005. “Lawful Access -  Consultation” 
Department o f Justice Canada (20 October 2005), online: Lawful Access -  Consultation Document 
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/>. For a critical analysis of earlier proposals, see CIPPIC, 
“Lawful Access” supra note 52; For a summary see “Meeting of G8 Ministers of Justice and Home 
Affairs,” Ministère de l ’intérieur, France (5 May 2003), online: UofT G8 Information Centre: G8 
Ministers of Justice and Interior Meetings <www.g8.utoronto.ca/justice/justice030505.htm>; R. v. 
Sharpe, [2002] B.C.J. No. 610 (B.C.S.C.) (QL) [Sharpe II].
45 For example, Alliance MP Gurmant Grewal criticized the decision of the B.C. Supreme Court in 
Sharpe //, focusing in particular on the defence of artistic merit. Calling for reform, he stated in the 
House: “[T]his is a gigantic loophole that the Liberals are permitting to stand where young children 
are being exploited by the animals in our society. What are they doing about that case?”, House o f 
Commons Debates, 154 (10 April 2002) at 1750 (Gurmant Grewal).
46 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Amend Other Acts, S.C. 2002, c. 13 [2002 Amendment]. 
Although the focus here is on Bill C-15A because it was ultimately enacted in 2002, numerous 
proposals for legislative change proliferated on the Parliamentary agenda from 2001 to 2004 (including 
prior incarnations of what eventually became Bill C-15A). A search on the term “pornography” on the 
legislative information site of the Library of Parliament indicates that from 1 January 2001 to 4 
October 2004, 16 bills relating to child pornography (some connected specifically with the Internet) 
were introduced in legislative debates. See “Search Results for Pornography” Library o f Parliament, 
LEGISInfo online: LEGISINFO -  The Library of Parliament’s research tool for finding information on 
legislation <http://www.parl.gc.ca/legisinfo/index.asp?Language=E&Session=14&List=search >.
prosecution of child sex tourism offences and creating an Internet luring offence, the 
2002 Amendment modified the child pornography provisions by :47
(i) specifically prohibiting various Internet-related modes of distributing 
child pornography through a computer system, including: transmitting 
and making it available;
(ii) specifically prohibiting knowingly accessing or causing child 
pornography to be transmitted to oneself;49
(iii) providing for warrants of seizure specifically relating to computer 
systems within the jurisdiction storing or making available child 
pornography;50
(iv) providing for forfeiture of things used in the commission of a child 
pornography offence;51 and
(v) adding child pornography to the list of offences for which courts may 
order convicted offenders or persons who it is reasonably feared will 
commit one or more of an enumerated list of sexual offences against a 
person under 14 to abstain from particular activities (e.g. having contact 
with minors).52
Canada continued its legislative, enforcement and educative efforts against 
child pornography in 2003-2004 and by 2005, numerous local, national and 
international Internet child pornography arrests had made headlines.53 On 20 July 
2005 Bill C-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (protection o f children and other 
vulnerable persons) (2005 Code Amendment), received royal assent.54 The 2005 
Code Amendment’s preamble refers to Canada’s international obligations under the
47 2002 Amendment, ibid., s. 3(2), now Code s. 7(4.3); Ibid., s. 8, now Code s. 172.1.
48 Ibid., s. 5(2), now Code s. 163.1(3Xa).
49 Ibid., s. 5(3), now Code s. 163.1(4.1)-(4.2). For further discussion, see David Goetz & Gerald 
Lafreniere, Legislative Summary, Bill C-15A: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to Amend 
Other Acts, LS-410E (30 September 2002).
50 2002 Amendment, ibid., s.7, now Code s. 164.1.
51 Ibid., s. 7, now Code ss. 164.2-3.
52 Ibid., ss. 4, 18, now Code s. 161 and s. 810 respectively.
53 For a more detailed description, see Government of Canada, “Response by Canada to July 30 request 
of Special Rapporteur on the sale o f children, child prostitution and child pornography” Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (2004), online: <http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues 
/children/rapporteur/Canada%20Gov.doc>; Ed Lavandera & Stacia Deshishku, “Ex-Boy Scout official 
faces child pom charges” CNN (28 March 2005); “Belarus Company Executives Extradited from 
France to Face Charges in Global Internet Child Pom Case” U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (11 January 2005), online: U.S. Charges Belarusians with Online Pornography 
Conspiracy -  US Department of State <http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Jan/12-845122.html>; 
and Canadian Press, “Toronto man faces child pom charges” Winnipeg Sun (25 January 2005).
54 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the 
Canada Evidence Act, S.C. 2005, c. 32.
CRC and the Optional Protocol and notes that technological developments are 
facilitating sexual exploitation and breaches of privacy.55
The 2005 Code Amendment maintains, and arguably expands (for example, by 
replacing the artistic merit and public good defences with the defence of legitimate 
purpose), criminal prohibitions on a wide variety of activities relating to works of the 
imagination involving children that do not actually include any real children in their 
production.56 Thus, traditional communicative forms, such as the stories at issue in 
Sharpe II and the paintings and drawings at issue in Langer, would continue to be 
susceptible to prosecution (and perhaps to conviction in the case of the Sharpe II 
materials).57 Further, audio recordings are now also covered. Conviction in relation 
to all of these forms would be possible with respect to materials the predominant 
characteristic of which is to describe or represent sexual activity with someone under 
18 for sexual purposes, even if they do not advocate or counsel sexual activity with 
children.58
PART II -  CONCEPTUALIZING “HARM”
In accepting that the Code restrictions on possession of child pornography were 
constitutionally justifiable in Sharpe, the SCC concluded that there was sufficient 
social science evidence, when combined with common sense and experience, to 
substantiate a reasoned apprehension of four kinds of harm arising from possession 
of child pornography:59
(i) child sexual abuse -  harm to children’s rights to dignity, bodily 
integrity, and privacy resulting from the sexual exploitation of children
55 Ibid., at Preamble.
56 Ibid., s. 7(7), amending Code ss. 163.1(6)-(7).
57 The trial judge in Sharpe II found that the written materials in issue did not advocate or counsel sexual 
activity with persons under 18 and had artistic merit, supra note 44 at paras. 32-34, 107-09. Given 
Shaw J.’s description of the materials as repugnant, it is at least open to question whether the new 
legitimate purpose without undue risk test would have been satisfied. On the other hand, the test 
included in s. 7(7) of the 2005 Code Amendment appears to have many similarities with McComb J.’s 
interpretation of the artistic merit defence in Langer, where that court concluded that the work had 
artistic merit and did not pose unreasonable risk of harm to persons under the age of 18, supra note 9 
at para. 153.
58 The Ontario Court of Appeal had already ruled prior to the amendment that writings describing sex 
between fathers and their young daughters, though not explicitly advocating or counselling sex with 
children could nevertheless fall within the “advocating and counselling” prohibition because they 
implicitly suggested that sex between adults and children was appropriate. See R. v. Beattie, (2005) 75 
O.R. (3d) 117 (C.A.).
59 The SCC explicitly rejected the argument that the Crown was required to produce “scientific proof 
based on concrete evidence” linking the possession of child pornography with the harms listed. As it 
had in the context of the obscenity provisions, the Court accepted that there was sufficient, though not 
in every instance conclusive, evidence to support a reasoned apprehension of a connection between the 
harms listed and the possession of child pornography. See Sharpe, supra note 3 at paras. 85-94. 
Certain aspects of the controversy surrounding the adoption of this standard are discussed in further 
detail below.
in the production of pornography and the continuing dissemination (or 
threat of dissemination) of these images over time;60
(ii) cognitive distortions -  increased risk of physical harm to children by 
“banalizing the awful, and numbing the conscience...[perhaps] making 
the abnormal seem normal and the immoral seem acceptable” thereby 
increasing the risk pedophiles will sexually abuse children;61
(iii) fuelling fantasies -  increased risk of physical harm to children by 
fuelling fantasies that incite sexual abuse of children;62 and
(iv) grooming -  if it is legal to possess child pornography, it is more readily 
available for use in grooming children in order to facilitate physical 
offences against them.63
Each of the harms listed by the SCC is tied in some way to the important objective of 
preventing physical harm to individual children by promoting their dignity, bodily 
integrity, and privacy rights through efforts to reduce the risk that they will be 
victimized by physical sexual abuse. With respect to non-physical collective harms, 
McLachlin C.J.C. noted:
While the government in this case did not present attitudinal harm to 
society at large as a justification for the law’s intrusion on the right o f free 
expression, this may be seen as a good incidental to the law’s main 
purpose -  the prevention o f harm to children.64
In contrast, the dissenting reasons of L ’Heureux-Dubé J. referred directly to 
collective, non-physical equality harms, stating:
The written material and images captured by s. 163.1(1) (which depict 
children engaged in explicit sexual activity or which depict their sexual 
organs for a sexual purpose), degrade and dehumanize them. They portray 
children as mere sexual objects available for the gratification o f adults.
They play on children's inequality. Hence, this material is in direct conflict 
with the guarantee o f equality in s. 15.65
The primacy of concern for the physical harms of child pornography expressed 
in the reasons of the Sharpe majority is also reflected in the approach Canadian 
courts have subsequently taken with respect to sentencing offenders; both 
analytically in sentencing methodologies and informally through the judicial 
language used to describe the material before them. The risk an offender presents to 
the community and the nature of the material at issue in each case figure prominently 
in sentencing decisions related to child pornography offences.66 Examination of the
60 Ibid. at para. 92.
61 Ibid. at paras. 87, 88.
62 Ibid. at para. 89.
63 Ibid. at para. 91.
64 Ibid. at para. 82.
65 Ibid. at para. 188.
66 R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 2000 SCC 5 at paras. 99-104.
“risk” factor in child pornography cases frequently focuses on whether the offender 
has been medically analyzed as being at high risk for future physical offences.67 
Often this analysis focuses on whether the offender has been diagnosed as a 
pedophile.68
The results in one case indicate that virtual child pornography will be treated 
less seriously (at least in terms of sentence) than non-virtual child pornography. In 
Chin the offender pled guilty to importing child pornography in relation to mail- 
ordered animated magazines from Japan depicting the sexual abuse of children.69 In 
jointly submitting that a non-custodial sentence was appropriate, the Crown and 
defence counsel referred to the nature of the material as a mitigating factor. While 
the Crown submitted that the material continued to pose a risk of harm, in terms of 
inflaming the interests of pedophiles, Crown counsel also argued that:
in the accused's favour, there were no real children exploited in the 
creation o f this. So that separates it from the vast majority o f cases.
.. ,[T]here are cases in child pornography sentences where a [non-custodial 
sentence] might not be inappropriate. In this case here where the accused 
has entered a guilty plea and there are no actual children, perhaps this is 
one o f those cases, Sir. And the Crown is suggesting in all the 
circumstances that it is one o f those cases.70
The submissions of defence counsel echoed these sentiments:
In any event, the Crown has fairly described the material as -  as artistic in 
nature. And I use that word guardedly. It's an artistic depiction described 
in the disclosure material as cartoon-like. The point being that o f course 
these are not photographs and they do not directly -...exp loit children.71
67 See e.g. R. v. Weber, [2003] O.J. No. 3306 (C.A.); R. v. Cohen, [2001] O.J. No. 1606 (C.A.); R. v. 
Batshaw (2004), 186 C.C.C. (3rd) 473 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Craig, 2005 CarswellOnt 664 (Ont. Ct. J.) 
(eC) [R. v. Craig]. For cases in which offenders diagnosed as pedophiles were determined not to 
present a significant risk of subsequent physical offences, see e.g. R. v. Mallett, 2005 CarswellOnt 
4350 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (eC); R. v. Anderson, 2005 CarswellAlta 634 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) (eC) [R. v. 
Anderson (2005)].
68 The diagnosis is generally premised upon the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders, 
4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1994) section 302.2 [DSM-IV], which 
requires the subject: (i) to be at least 16 years old and a minimum of five years older than the child 
described in (ii); (ii) to have had over a period of at least 6 months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges or sexual activity with a child (generally under 13 years of age); and (iii) to 
have acted on the urges or been markedly distressed or experienced interpersonal problems due to 
these fantasies. Although not all child sexual offenders meet the strict definition of “pedophilia” (see 
Kenneth V. Lanning, “Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis” National Center fo r  Missing and 
Exploited Children (2001), online: NC70.pdf <http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications 
/NC70.pdf> at 22, 25), some studies suggest that those diagnosed as pedophiles pose a higher risk of 
repeat offending. See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, “Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis 
of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies” (1998) 66 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 348.
69 R. v. Chin, [2005] A.J. No. 1712 (Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)) [Chin].
70 Ibid. at paras. 30, 32.
71 Ibid. at paras. 48-50. It is notable that the transcript shows that it was the judge who initially completed 
the sentence, inserting “exploit children” and that this phrase was then adopted in the submissions of 
counsel. Defence counsel later referred to situations in which conditional sentences were imposed in 
relation to what he called “the real child pornography”, ibid. at para. 54.
The prioritization of the physical harms of child pornography is also evident in the 
language used to describe the nature of the child pornography at issue in these 
particular cases. In some instances, child pornography is categorized as more serious 
in relation to the level of physical abuse thought to be depicted, as follows:
Level 1 - Non-erotic/non-sexualized material;
Level 2 - Dominant characteristic is focus on genital, sex organ, or anal 
region;
Level 3 - Explicit sexual activity and assaults between adults and children or 
between young children;
Level 4 - “Gross” assaults involving penetration by adults; and
Level 5 - Sadistic sexual images involving children.72
Similarly, the emphasis on physical harm is often reflected in the language 
courts use to describe the images involved in a case. In Sutherland, after describing 
a number of images involving ten and eleven year old girls in penetration, fellatio, 
and “strip tease” as “quite disturbing and numbingly similar”, the sentencing judge 
went on to list as a mitigating factor that “[t]here [wa]s no evidence that any of the 
images involved things like torture or mutilation of children.”73 One court described 
as “non-violent” the rape of an unconscious minor captured in the child pornography 
at issue in the case.74 Another judgment described as a mitigating factor the fact that 
a man who lured a 14 year old girl to a motel room in order to use her in the 
production of child pornography had not touched the girl himself during 
production.75 Comments of this nature, as well as equating the seriousness of 
images with the level or type of physical violence depicted is, of course, not isolated 
to situations involving child sexual abuse or child pornography. They are part of a 
broader socio-legal pattern that all too often prioritizes, while at the same time 
mischaracterizing, the physical violence of sexual assault.76
72 These roughly approximate the “levels” approach adopted by the English Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Oliver, [2002] E.W.J. No. 5441, and also relied upon in Canada in R. v. G.H.K., [2005] B.C.J. No. 
2874 at para. 8 (Prov. Ct.); andÆ. v. Missions, [2005] N.S.J. No. 177 at para.14 (C.A.).
73 R. v. Sutherland, [2006] B.C.J. No. 796 at paras. 7, 9 (Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)).
74 R. v. Paton, 2005 CarswellNun 7 (Nu. Ct. J. (Prov. Div.)), cited in R. v. Moen, 2006 W.C.B.J. LEXIS 4 
at para. 8(j) (Lexis).
75 R. v. Fulton, [2005] AJ No. 1077 at para. 63 (Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)) [/?. v. Fulton].
76 As noted by “Jane Doe”, “[c]ontrary to its original intent, the term “sexual assault” has been hijacked, 
once again, to minimize the violent nature of forced sexual intercourse or rape. The definition focuses 
instead on the presence or degree of bodily harm or injury that accompanies a rape. It makes a date 
rape or a rape by your partner or co-worker, where there is no physical violence, less serious or violent 
than, say, my rape [by a stranger at knife-point] was... . The current definition places acts of unwanted 
touching, molestation and other assaultive or degrading sexual behaviour that women experience 
solely because of their gender at the bottom of a hierarchy under the rubric of sexual assault.” Jane 
Doe, The Story o f Jane Doe: A Book About Rape (Toronto: Random House, 2003) at 113-14. While 
this need not be the case as some courts have recognized that “violence” should not be confined to 
physical attacks (see R. v. Newton, [2006] O.J. No. 1108 at para. 83 [Newton]), legal analyses are all 
too often predominated by a focus on physical harms (see e.g. L.M. c. R., [2006] J.Q. No. 4966 
(C.A.)).
Most critics of restrictions on possession of child pornography, and of the Code 
provisions in particular, do not dispute children’s right to be free from abuse.77 
However, in the context of the Code provisions in general and the SCC’s analysis in 
Sharpe in particular, two principle contentions relating to the relevant social science 
evidence and the breadth of the provisions continue to be debated.
With respect to social science evidence, it is argued that the connection between 
possession of child pornography, especially virtual child pornography, and physical 
harm to children is simply too tenuous to justify limiting possessors’ rights to 
freedoms of conscience, expression and privacy.78 These critiques acknowledge the 
existence of studies showing that those convicted of sex offences against children are 
frequently also consumers of child pornography. However, they point out that such 
studies do not conclusively demonstrate any necessary cause and effect relationship 
between consumption and subsequent commission of physical offences.7 In 
contrast, others have argued that provisions of the type currently in the Code and 
approaches such as those of the SCC in Sharpe do not go far enough in terms of 
protecting the rights and interests of children.80 These critiques argue greater 
attention ought to be paid to the powerful evidence on the role of child pornography 
in the lived reality of sexually abused children.81
With respect to the breadth of provisions like those found in the Code, it has 
been argued that such restrictions trench too far on individual expression and may 
actually hinder adolescents’ and teens’ healthy sexual exploration and development
77 At least one organization, NAMBLA, argues that sex between adults and children is not necessarily 
abusive and promotes sexual relations between men and boys. See R. v. B.J.F.W., [2004] S.J. No. 392 
at para. 48.
78 See e.g. “Civil Liberties Group Supports Prohibitions Against Child Pornography, But Opposes Current 
Law” British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (26 April 1999), online: BCCLA News Release: 
Civil liberties group supports prohibitions against child pornography, but opposes current law 
<http://www.bccla.org/pressreleases/99sharpe.html>; “Submissions to the Standing Committee on 
Justice and Human Rights Re: Child Pornography Provisions of Bill C-20” Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association (7 October 2003), online: CCLA Positions <http://www.ccla.org/pos/briefs/oct7%20- 
%20child%20pomography%20provisions.shtml>; and Ryder, supra note 5 at paras. 8, 54-55, 62-64.
79 Ryder, ibid. at paras. 8, 54-55, 62. For a review of the numerous studies on the relationship between 
viewing child pornography and committing sexual offences against children, see L. Jill Rettinger, “The 
Relationship between Child Pornography and the Commission of Sexual Offences Against Children: A 
Review of the Literature” Department o f Justice Canada (March 2000), online: rr00-5.pdf 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2000/rr00-5.pdf>.
80 Quayle’s research, for example, suggests that much of the material contained in the collections of 
pedophiles and others engaged in the child pornography trade is not even covered by the legal 
definitions of child pornography: Max Taylor & Ethel Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime 
(New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2003) at 6 [Taylor & Quayle, Internet Crime]; See e.g. Benedet, 
supra note 5 at 335-37; Diana E.H. Russell, “Pornography as a Cause of Rape” in Against 
Pornography: The Evidence o f Harm (Berkeley: Russell Publications, 1994), online: Pom Table of 
Contents <http://www.dianarussell.com/pomtoc.html> (discussing the connection between adult 
pornography and rape); and with respect to the equality implications, see “Memorandum of the 
Interveners Beyond Borders, CASE, ECPAT and the International Bureau for Children’s Rights in R. 
v. Robin Sharpe” Beyond Borders (30 November 1999), online: Beyond Borders 
<http://www.beyondborders.org/p6.shtml>.
81 Benedet, supra note 5 at 335-337.
by prohibiting, among other things, depictions and stories of otherwise lawful sexual 
activity.82 In response, it has been noted that the SCC in Sharpe limited the 
restriction on possession of auto-created works and images that are held privately 
and therefore do not become part of the child pornography trade. Further, it has been 
argued that even these exceptions go too far by protecting third-party adult 
possession of photographs of legal sexual activity between youths taken by the 
possessor.83
The purpose of this paper is not to re-hash or attempt to resolve the debate on 
whether provisions like those in the Code strike an appropriate freedom of 
expression balance.84 Instead, this paper is meant to explore the question of how the 
introduction of emerging technologies might reshape the focus of that analysis or 
affect its validity, all else being equal. However, some observations with respect to 
the social science and over-breadth debates seem to be necessary in order to 
contextualize the technology-focused discussion that follows.
Protecting individual children from the physical and emotional harms resulting 
from sexual abuse is an indisputable social good, but legal analyses relating to child 
pornography that focus on this aspect of harm have, perhaps tellingly, failed to fully 
take account of collective equality harms that have been specifically highlighted in 
other contexts, such as obscenity. 5 A continuing focus on the strength or weakness 
of the social science evidence relating to the connection between individual 
consumption and subsequent physical offences risks continued obfuscation of 
broader collective implications that I will suggest are likely to be brought to the fore 
by emerging technologies. It is not suggested that these broader concerns are 
necessarily unconnected with individual physical harm. It certainly seems plausible 
to anticipate that widespread commodification of children and their sexuality as 
“things” properly possessed and traded for the consumptive “pleasure” of others 
could play a role in facilitating attitudes receptive to (or at least less concerned
82 While the child pornography provisions in the Code impose restrictions with respect to persons or 
depictions of person under the age o f 18, other provisions in the Code legally recognize the capacity of 
persons aged 14 and over to consent to engage in non-exploitive sexual activity. The provisions 
relating to the age of consent were made the subject of Bill C-22, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code 
(Age o f Protection) and to Make Consequential Amendments to the Criminal Records Act, 39th Pari., 1st 
Session (First Reading: 3 April 2006), online: LEGISINFO <http://www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO 
/index.asp?Language=E&Chamber=N&StartList=A&EndList=Z&Session=14&Type=0&Scope=I&qu 
ery=4804&List=toc-2>.
83 Benedet, supra note 5.
84 For what it is worth, I find the arguments in favour of the validity of these kinds of restrictions to be 
the more compelling ones, particularly in light of the broader social consequences of the child 
pornography trade, which are discussed in detail below.
85 Butler, supra note 13 at para. 74. See Keegstra, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
about) physicial abuse.86 What I want to suggest, however, is the importance of 
closely examining the other social harms that the commodification process itself may 
occasion on community commitments to equality and dignity, and to children and 
youths as the targeted group within that community. In that regard, I find the words 
of Dickson C.J.C. (as he then was) in the context of hate propaganda to be 
instructive. I suggest that we reframe the inquiry in a manner that probes more 
deeply the ways in which the commodifying impact of the child pornography trade 
typecasts children and youths as entities properly “denied respect and dignity simply 
because of [the personal] characteristic [of age]” -  “[a] brand of expressive 
activity...wholly inimical to the democratic aspirations of the free expression 
guarantee.”87 In so doing, we may be in a position to confront more directly the 
ways in which this trade undermines community aspirations for a society founded on 
equality among all citizens.88
It may also be that the debate surrounding the breadth of provisions like those 
found in the Code and the lawful sexual activity and sexual exploration of youths 
will be altered by technology — a topic discussed in further detail below in Part III, 
1(B). However, even apart from technological advances I would suggest that we 
ought to be cognizant of the qualitative differences between youths engaging in 
lawful sexual activity and exploration, and the capturing of that activity in a 
distributable record. When that record moves beyond the possession of those who 
created and/or are depicted or identified in it, the record itself can be used to 
occasion assaults on the dignity, equality and personal privacy of any individual 
youths involved -  even where the activity itself was non-exploitive and consensual. 
Further, once the pornographic material moves beyond its creator, it risks becoming 
part and parcel of the trade in child sexuality, triggering broader collective concerns, 
even in situations where no identifiable “real” children or youths are involved. 
These concerns are likely to take on renewed significance as we confront 
technological developments that make it increasingly easy not just to create the 
record, but to disseminate it, download it, cut and paste it and re-distribute it to 
connected consumers worldwide.
PART III. THE DIFFERENCE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES MAKE
Digital technological developments, such as the Internet, present marked techno- 
socio-cultural change of unprecedented proportion, at least in terms of facilitating the
86 For a compelling analysis of the connection between pornography, discrimination, and violence, see 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s Lives, Men's Laws (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2005) at 302-03, 341-42. In the context of the long term connections between hate 
speech, discrimination, and violence, see Alexander Tsesis, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech 
Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements (New York: New York University Press, 2002) at 99- 
117; Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado, The Price We Pay: The Case Against Racist Speech, Hate 
Propaganda, and Pornography (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); and Gordon W. Allport, The 
Nature o f Prejudice, 3rd ed. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
87 R. v. Keegstra, supra note 16.
88 In general, Canadian law has done little to advance either the meaning or the cause of equality for 
children in society. Marvin Bernstein, “The Decision o f the Supreme Court of Canada Upholding the 
Constitutionality of Section 43 of the Criminal Code of Canada: What this Decision Means to the 
Child Welfare Sector” (2006) 44 Family Court Review 104, online: Blackwell Synergy - Single 
Article Purchase <http://www.blackwell-synergy.eom/doi/full/10.l 11 l/j,1744-1617.2006.00070.x>.
rapid exchange of multiple types of content (text, images, voice, etc.) between users 
across dispersed geographic regions in a context that may, in many circumstances, 
feel quite private to the user, and yet is readily accessible to, or just the push of a 
button away from, a wide public audience. The ever-improving and increasingly 
available software and hardware that enable creation of increasingly lifelike “virtual” 
images and manipulation and reintegration of “real” images represent a similarly 
significant techno-socio-cultural development.
In the context o f laws restricting child pornography (on which there has been 
both a remarkable level of international consensus as well as a deep and fundamental 
level of local, national, and international controversy), both o f these aspects of the 
changing technological context present incremental and transformative challenges.89 
The monumental expansion of distribution and accessibility of child pornography 
facilitated by the Internet and other digital technologies aiding in its creation 
generate not only incremental effects in terms of scope, but also the potentially 
transformative opportunity to confront more directly the collective harms of child 
pornography and the rights of children and youths in our communities.
1. Incremental Effects
Technological change regularly challenges the efficacy of law in addressing human 
behaviours and expands the scope of behaviours previously circumscribed by law. 
Advances in digital technologies have, in fact, posed practical challenges relating to 
the enforcement of prohibitions on child pornography. These challenges have been 
addressed through changes in both legislation and enforcement strategy in an effort 
to continue to combat child pornography.
(A) Expanded Access and Distribution and “Virtual” Imagery
Digital networks have expanded the accessibility of many types of images and 
information -  and this is no less true in the context of child pornography. As Martin 
Calder has noted:
The Internet with its growing capacity to exchange in real time written 
messages, telephone calls, data, sound, still and moving pictures, has 
broken the traditional communication barriers and makes incalculable 
quantities o f information o f all kinds and forms instantly available to 
anyone with a personal computer...Child pornography has thus grown into 
a massive industry that systematically promotes the abuse o f  children.90
89 The online market for pornography has driven technological innovation, particularly with respect to 
pressure to increase bandwidth and improve video-streaming. See Frederick Lane, Obscene Profits: 
The Entrepreneurs o f Pornography in the Cyber Age (New York: Routledge, 2000); and Jon Swartz 
“Online pom often leads high-tech way” USA Today (9 March 2004), online: USAToday.com -  
Online pom leads high-tech way <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2004-03- 
09-onlinepom_x.htm>.
90 Martin C. Calder, “The Internet: Potential, Problems and Pathways to Hands-On Sexual Offending” in 
Martin C. Calder, ed., Child Sexual Abuse and the Internet: Tackling the New Frontier (Dorset: 
Russell House, 2004) at 6-7 [Calder],
The impact of the Internet on the scope of the child pornography trade has also 
been noted in judicial reasons relating to online child pornography charges and, not 
infrequently, features prominently in decisions on sentencing. As noted by the 
Alberta Court of Appeal in Hunt:
The menace that distribution o f child pornography through the internet 
poses cannot be underestimated. The internet provides an unregulated, 
instant world-wide distribution network that is immediately accessible for 
viewing, downloading, and even wider distribution.92
As part of its mandate, the Combating Paedophile Information Networks in 
Europe (COPINE) Project has amassed a database of pictures from 60 Internet 
newsgroups involving the online trade in child pornography.93 As of 2001, its 
database included approximately 80,000 pictures and more than 400 video clips 
ranging from “non-erotic” pictures sexualized by persons with an interest in children 
through to sexual images of children involving sadism or bestiality.94 The COPINE 
Project reported in 2001 that, on average, images involving two new children per 
month were appearing in the newsgroups that it monitored, that the age of the 
children involved appeared to be getting younger, and that the number of Eastern 
European children involved had grown. 5 Over the two year period from 2000 to 
2002, members of the COPINE Project estimated that they had downloaded 
explicitly sexual images of over 2000 boys and girls and a similar number involving 
erotic naked posing. Three hundred to 350 of the children in their sample had been 
photographed while being sexually assaulted over the prior 10 to 15 year period.96
91 See e.g. R. v. Lac, [2005] AJ No. 1019 at para. 55 (Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)) [Lac]-, R. v. Rideout, [1998] 
A.J. No. 199 at para. 53 (Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)); R. v. M.L., [2005] A.J. No. 82 at para. 15 (Prov. Ct. 
(Crim. Div.)) [R. v. M.L.].
92 R. v. Hunt, [2002] AJ No. 831 at para. 29 (C.A.).
93 The COPINE Project was founded in 1997 as part of the Department of Applied Psychology, 
University College Cork, Ireland and works in coordination with numerous international law 
enforcement and other agencies to address child sexual exploitation on the Internet. The database, 
which was amassed from 2001 to 2004, has since been transferred to INTERPOL. See “Copine 
Project” Copine Project, online: COPINE Project Homepage <http://www.copine.ie/index.php>.
94 The COPINE project categorizes child pornography into ten levels from images classified as indicative 
(non-erotic pictures of children) to sexualized images obviously involving pain and/or animals. Max 
Taylor, Ethel Quayle & Gemma Holland, “Child Pornography, the Internet and Offending” (2001) 2 
Cdn. J. Policy Research 94 at 96, online: ISUMA Child Pornography, the Internet and offending 
<http://www.isuma.net/v02n02/taylor/taylor_e.shtml> [Taylor, Quayle & Holland]. Its categorization 
involves images of children (e.g. “indicative”) that do not fall within legal definitions of child 
pornography because, as Taylor argues elsewhere, the legal definitions of child pornography are, in 
fact, under-inclusive since many persons with a sexual interest in children sexualize what would 
otherwise be perceived of as non-sexualized images of children. See Taylor, “Nature and Dimensions”, 
supra note 6.
95 Taylor, Quayle & Holland, ibid. at 96.
96 Taylor, “Nature and Dimensions”, supra note 6 at 8.
The COPINE Project reported that child pornography is accessed and created 
online through:
(i) bulletin board systems, where those with access can engage in real time 
conversation as well as uploading and downloading files;
(ii) Internet Relay Chat, which affords opportunities not only for real time 
communication, but for the direct exchange of files and images from one 
participant to another;
(iii) the World Wide Web, which allows access to images and relatively easy 
capturing and downloading of images; and
(iv) usenet and newsgroups, which permit the posting of requests for images 
and their exchange, with an estimated 1000 illegal photographs being 
posted per week.
The current evidence relating to the relationship between online child 
pornography and child sexual abuse appears to reveal trends similar to those noted in 
the offline environment. Those committing sexual offences against children are 
often consumers of child pornography, using it for purposes of sexual gratification, 
as well as for grooming children to participate in their own victimization.98 One 
U.S.-based study of online child victimization showed that 40% of offenders arrested 
for possession of child pornography were also individuals who had sexually 
victimized children, with the two crimes being discovered in the same 
investigation.99 Of those arrested, 39% possessed moving images in digital or other 
video formats, 65% had basic home computing equipment, 22% had particularly 
powerful computing equipment, but only 7% had computer equipment that might be 
considered similar to equipment an expert would own, and only 3% had images 
generated through computer graphics.100
97 Taylor, Quayle & Holland, supra note 94 at 97.
98 In many instances, those charged with child pornography offences are also charged with, or have 
previously been convicted of, offences involving child sexual assault. See e.g. R. v. Netzel, [2006] 
O.J. No. 1411 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)); R. v. J.P.F., [2002] B.C.J. No. 1439; R. v. A.G.M., [2001] B.C.J. 
No. 1529; R. v. Sharif, [1998] B.C.J. No. 3211; R. v. M.A.G., [1998] B.C.J. No. 3210; Lac, supra 
note 91; R. v. M.B.H., [2004] O.J. No. 1679 (C.A.); R. v. T.C., [2004] 72 O.R. (3d) 623 (C.A.); R. v. 
Hall (2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.); Newton, supra note 76; R. v. Gabourie, [2005] A.J. No. 1950; 
With respect to the offline context, see U.S., Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children 
and the Constitution: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) at 
62-63 (testimony of Ernest E. Allen, President & Chief Executive Officer, The National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children), online: 88680.pdf <http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/ 
18aug20031230/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/107hrg/88680.pdf>. With respect to the 
online context, see Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor & Kimberly J. Mitchell, “Child-Pomography 
Possessors Arrested in Internet-Related Crimes: Findings from the National Juvenile Online 
Victimization Study” National Center fo r Missing & Exploited Children (May 2005), online: 
NC144.pdf <http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf>.
99 Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell, ibid. at 7, 16.
100 Ibid. at 7-8. In Tylek, [2006] A.J. No. 391 (Prov. Ct. J.), the offender had, among other things, created 
what he referred to as “boy-art” in which he digitally cut and pasted photographs of his own genitals 
on photographs of young boys.
Digital technologies that facilitate the full or partial generation of images, such 
as photo-shopping, also have the potential to change the child pornography trade. 
Digitally created virtual child pornography primarily includes two categories of 
material: (i) child pornography images that are wholly computer generated; and (ii) 
child pornography images created from images of real children, but which have been 
digitally manipulated in some way (e.g. the face of an actual child is digitally super­
imposed on a picture of an adult body engaged in sexual activity). Some have 
argued that wholly computer generated images that are virtually indistinguishable 
from photographic images of actual children do not yet exist and are unlikely to be 
widely produced, at least in the short term.101
The technologies for creation of digital humans are currently extremely 
expensive, complex, time-consuming, often require highly specialized environments 
in which to operate, and frequently depend upon photographs of real people in order 
to function. These features render such technologies relatively inaccessible for 
use outside of specialized environments, such as large production studios with 
significant financial resources. Even in those situations, it is difficult to exactly 
mirror humans, particularly if they are in motion, without creating a “fake” that is 
discernable either to the naked eye or with the use of increasingly sophisticated 
equipment.103 That said, as the power of personal computers multiplies and the 
accessibility of high-quality photo-shopping technologies increases, the future may 
well hold the prospect of more widespread creation of photorealistic images that are 
wholly computer generated.104 As one author has noted:
Five years down the road, experts say, a hybrid between a game and a 
movie could allow viewers/players to design and direct their own films 
and even put themselves into the action. You might first cast the film by 
scanning photos o f real people -  you and your friends, for instance -  and 
running software that would create photoreal 3-D models o f those people.
Then, in real time, you could direct the film’s action via a hand-held 
controller or keyboard -  anything from zooming the camera around the
101 Richard L. Hardy, “Virtual Child Pornography: Fact or Fiction?” National Association o f Attorneys 
General Cybercrime Newsletter 1 (April-May 2004) 2 at 4 [Hardy]. See also Susan S. Kreston, 
“Defeating the Virtual Defense in Child Pornography Prosecutions” (2004) 4 J. High Tech. L. 49 at 72.
102 Nadia Magnenat-Thalmann & Laurent Moccozet, “Some New Challenging Research Topics in Human 
Animation” 17th Spring Conference on Computer Graphics (SCCG’01) (2001), online: sccg, 17th 
Spring Conference on Computer Graphics (SCCG ’01) <http://csdl2.computer.org/persagen 
/DLAbsToc.jsp?resourcePath=/dl/proceedings/sccg/&toc=comp/proceedings/sccg/2001/l 215/00/1215t 
oc.xml&DOI=10.1109/SCCG.2001.945332> at 12-13; Barnabas Takacs & Bernadette Kiss, “The 
Virtual Human Interface: A Photorealistic Digital Human” (2003) 23 IEEE Computer Graphics and 
Applications 5 at 38.
103 Hardy, supra note 101 at 3, quoting Dr. Robert Fiete, “Detecting Fake Images” (Lecture presented at 
Examination of Digital Child Pornography, Chappaqua, New York 2 December 2003); Tsuneo Ikedo, 
“Creating Realistic Scenes in Future Multimedia Systems” (2002) 9 IEEE Multimedia 4 at 61; and 
Siwei Lyu & Hany Farid, “How Realistic is Photorealistic?” (2005) 53 I.E.E.E. Transactions on Signal 
Processing 845.
104 For an impressive example of one wholly computer generated still image of an adolescent face, see 
Alceu Baptistao, “Kaya”, online: Kaya <http://www.vetorzero.com.br/kaya/>.
characters to making the lead actor run in a certain direction. Interactive 
entertainment.. .is where the real future is .105
Technologies for digitally manipulating real photographic images are much 
more widely available and commonplace.106 One expert notes:
Today, altering the content o f an image does not require dark room tricks 
but merely a PC with image editing software. Desktop software is readily 
available and easy to use, allowing anyone to quickly and creatively alter 
images. The easiest approach is to simply cut a section from one image 
and embed it into another image. The desktop software allows the creator 
to modify the extracted image to the appropriate size and rotation. The 
software on the market today is so easy to use that pre-school children 
have little difficulty creating impressive altered images.107
While technologies are available for detecting situations in which real photographic 
images have been manipulated, reaching a definitive conclusion in that regard in 
relation to any particular image can be complicated by numerous factors, including 
situations in which the size of the digital file containing the image is reduced in order 
to transmit it via the Internet.108
(B) Enforcement and Prosecution Challenges
At the same time as these technological changes have, at least to some extent, made 
child pornography a more visible social problem leading to calls for greater legal 
regulation such as those discussed in Part I above, they also present certain 
challenges for enforcement and prosecution.109 Three of the more prominent of 
these include: (i) the problem of identification; (ii) the meaning of “possession” in a 
digital context; and (iii) the “virtual image” defence.
i. The Problem o f Identification
One of the key features of many forms of Internet communication has been the 
ability to participate without necessarily disclosing one’s name, address, or other 
personally identifying information. Pseudonymous and anonymous communication 
can play a critical role both in facilitating socially valuable forms of communication,
105 Gregory T. Huang, “The New Face of Hollywood” (2004) 107:7 Technology Review 67 at 69, online: 
Technology Review <http://www.techreview.com/articles/04/09/huang0904.asp>.
106 For a discussion o f some of the current advances in photo-shopping software, see: “Adobe Photoshop”, 
online: Image editing tools for photo retouching -  digital software by Adobe <http://www.adobe.com 
/products/photoshop/newfeatures.html>.
107 Robert Fiete, “Photo Fakery” (2005) 5 OE Magazine 16, online: oe magazine -  photofakery 
<http://www.oemagazine.com/fromTheMagazine/jan05/photofakery.html>.
108 Lyu & Farid, supra note 103; See Timothy J. Perla, “Attempting to End the Cycle o f Virtual 
Pornography Prohibitions” (2003) 83 B.U.L. Rev. 1209 at 1220-21.
109 One of the key barriers to law enforcement relates to jurisdictional issues, which the international 
initiatives referred to in Part I are partially designed to address. For further analysis of Internet 
jurisdiction issues more generally, see Michael Geist, “Is There a There There? Towards Greater 
Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction” (2001) 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1345.
such as whistle-blowing, as well as in facilitating socially destructive forms of 
communication, such as child pornography and hate propaganda. Consumers and 
purveyors of child pornography rely on anonymity and pseudonymity in an effort to 
prevent connection between their online activities and their real space identities.110 
These kinds of challenges led one Toronto Police Service detective to observe 
“officers...were falling behind sex offenders because they lacked the tools and 
training to properly investigate crimes...or penetrate shadowy communities of 
pedophiles.” 11
Paradoxically, more technology has proven to be part of the answer to these 
technological barriers to identification. Members of police forces now rely upon 
anonymity and pseudonymity in order to infiltrate online child pornography rings in 
order to gain identifying information that has led to numerous arrests. 12 Further, 
Microsoft’s Child Exploitation Tracking System (CETS) allows the RCMP to 
maintain a centralized database permitting investigators from more than 25 Canadian 
police forces to share information about perpetrators and victims and has had an 
international impact.113
While pseudonymity and anonymity online are undoubtedly challenging in 
terms of law enforcement, the traceable record of online activity kept by most ISPs 
has proven to be a ready cache of identifying information.114 When records can be 
obtained from ISPs (through appropriate judicial processes) it is, in some ways, more 
possible than ever before to identify those involved in many aspects of child
110 On the other hand, at least a certain number of child pornography consumers have been convicted as 
the result of failing to recognize the degree to which providing credit card information left a trail 
between their online consumption activities and their real space identities. That notwithstanding, a 
number of those charged as a result of the Landslide investigation claim to have been the victims of 
credit card fraud. See CBC, “Landslide”, supra note 34; and CBC News, “False accusations”, supra 
note 34).
111 Paul Roberts & Joris Evers, “Microsoft creates tools to crack child pom cases” The Industry Standard 
(7 April 2005), online: Microsoft creates tools to creack child pom cases: Internet News from The 
Industry Standard <http://www.thestandard.eom/intemetnews/001202.php>.
112 In March 2006, 40 people were arrested from Canada, the United States, Australia, and England in 
connection with an online child pornography chat room that Edmonton and Toronto police infiltrated 
using the alias of an Edmonton man they had arrested while he was still logged on to the chat site. See 
Adrian Humphreys, “Child pom ring busted: at least 10 of 40 arrested in Canada” The National Post 
(16 March 2006). See also R. v. Anderson, [2006] AJ. No. 244 (Prov. Ct.).
113 Roberts & Evers, supra note 111; CETS reportedly led to the Toronto Police Services laying charges 
for sexual assault against a man already arrested in relation to child pornography by identifying a link 
between information in two separate investigations that had been ongoing in the United States (ibid.).
114 However, identification of the subscriber associated with a particular Internet Protocol address is not 
necessarily identification of the individual responsible for the material in issue. Even where the 
subscriber and household can be identified, where a number of individuals have access to the computer 
and account identified, further work must be done to determine which individual is responsible for the 
content. Identification in these situations has been made relying on both traditional means (analyzing 
the opportunity of others to gain access) (see R. v. Missions, supra note 72), as well as through 
technological means by demonstrating that the accused was “signed on” at the terminal using a 
password known only to him during the same session in which child pornography was accessed.
pornography.115 As noted in the results of the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey 
(UCRS) in 2003:
Since 1998, there has been an eight-fold increase in the number o f charges 
laid by police for child pornography, from a low o f 20 charges in 1998 to a 
high o f 159 charges in 2003. This increase may be attributed to the 
proliferation and affordability o f digital video and camera equipment 
coupled with the ease o f  transmitting images over the Internet as well as 
increased enforcement efforts and targeted detection by police forces.1,6
ii. The Meaning o f “Possession”
Numerous arguments focusing on particular aspects of digital network technology 
have been advanced by those accused of possessing child pornography.117 Of 
primary focus has been the question of what constitutes proof of “possession” in a 
digital environment.118 “Possession” for purposes of Canadian criminal law requires 
proof that, at the relevant time, the individual accused had the impugned material in 
his or her “personal possession or...knowingly ha[d] it in any place, whether or not 
that place belongs to or is occupied by him [or her], for the use or benefit of himself 
[or herself] or of another person. ”119
In the digital networked context, a question has been raised as to whether one 
must download material from the network onto the hard drive of one’s computer in 
order for possession to be proven. In Daniels the Newfoundland Court of Appeal 
considered whether the accused could be convicted of possession of child 
pornography in a situation where he subscribed to a bulletin board from which files 
containing child pornography could be downloaded after requesting permission from 
the board operator.12 The accused claimed that although he had requested 
permission to download files, the content of which had been described to him in 
graphic detail, he had aborted the downloading process, so that he had never viewed 
the images contained in the files, nor had he actually downloaded the files to his 
computer’s hard drive.
115 Identification, of course, is complicated by numerous other technological devices and systems that 
permit individuals to further cloak their identities. The use of proxy servers and anonymous remailers 
are two examples of such anonymizing technologies. See e.g. Myma L. Wigod, “Privacy in Public and 
Private E-Mail and On-Line Systems” (1998) 19 Pace L. Rev. 95 at 141-42; Robyn Forman Pollack, 
“Creating The Standards of a Global Community: Regulating Pornography on the Internet -  An 
International Concern” (1996) 10 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 467 at 480-81.
116 Kathy Aucoin, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, “Children and Youth as Victims of Violent 
Crime” 25:1 Juristat 1 (April 2005) at 11.
117 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Ty E. Howard, “Don’t Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting 
Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet Files” (2004) 19 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1227.
118 See e.g. George S. Takach, “Criminal Law” in Computer Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) at 
fn 3 (QL).
119 Code, supra note 2, s. 4(3)(a).
120 R. v. Daniels, [2004] N.J. No. 406 (C.A.).
After reviewing the definition of “possession” noted above, the Court of Appeal 
upheld Daniels’s conviction, finding that although he had not actually been in 
possession of child pornography, he had constructively possessed it in that: (i) he 
knew that the files contained child pornography; (ii) he intended or consented to 
possession of them (as proven by his request to download); and (iii) he had control 
over the material once the downloading process commenced, regardless of whether 
he fully downloaded the files and viewed the images they contained. The Court 
concluded:
Once the downloading o f the transmission commenced, the material was 
in a place over which Daniels had control. If he had not engaged the skip 
file function, reception o f the image and downloading would have been 
completed. This situation may be contrasted with the five other files 
containing child pornography that Daniels ordered, but aborted before the 
downloading commenced.12
In circumstances such as those in Daniels, it appears incumbent on the Crown 
to prove that the downloading process has commenced, even if it has not been 
completed, in order for possession to be made out.122 In some U.S. cases, where an 
accused has viewed child pornography online without downloading it, prosecutors 
have relied on forensic analysis to show deletion of files containing child 
pornography previously stored on an accused’s computer. In those situations, 
accused persons have argued that “possession” cannot be proven where they have 
taken steps to delete files containing child pornography, including those in the 
temporary cache on their computers.12
While the success of the defence has been divided, those U.S. courts dealing 
with it have generally continued to analyse the same elements of “possession” as are 
used in the offline context.124 However, as one U.S. prosecutor has pointed out, two 
situations can be distinguished.125 First, evidence as to what was stored in the 
temporary cache file could be led simply as proof that an accused had been in prior 
possession of child pornography (in which case whether the accused knew or 
intended for the files to be backed up is irrelevant). Second, the content o f the cache 
file could be led as evidence of present possession (in which case the accused’s 
knowledge of the existence of the cached files is relevant).126
121 Ibid. at para. 14.
122 Downloading and printing have been found in the U.K. context to amount not only to “possession”, 
but to “making” indecent images o f children. See R. v. Bowden, [2001] Q.B. 88.
123 “A cache...is a storage mechanism designed to speed up the loading of Internet displays” by making 
and storing copies of the visited web pages in temporary files that can be relied upon to speed up 
access to that content the next time it is sought by the computer. See Howard, supra note 117 at 1239- 
40.
124 Ibid. at 1253.
125 These distinctions may also be relevant to proof of possession where forensic computer analysis 
reveals that files containing child pornography have been deleted from the hard drive of an accused’s 
computer. One U.K. court concluded that an accused could not be said to be in possession o f child 
pornography at a time when the files containing it had been deleted from his hard drive and were no 
longer retrievable by him. See R. v. Porter, [2006] E.W.J. No. 9 at paras. 21-22 (C.A. (Crim. Div.)).
126 Howard, supra note 117 at 1254-55.
Other features unique to networked technology have formed the basis for 
possession-related defences, even where images have actually been downloaded to 
the computer’s hard drive. A number of accused persons have relied on the so-called 
Trojan horse defence. A Trojan horse “is a malicious computer program that is 
disguised as legitimate software” which creates a “back door” to one’s computer, 
allowing those placing the software on the computer to access that computer to, 
among other things, cause the downloading of files not otherwise known to the 
computer’s owner.127 Accused men in the United Kingdom have walked away from 
child pornography charges after bringing forward opinions from computer forensic 
experts that demonstrated the presence of Trojan horses on their computers, which 
were blamed for the downloading of the child pornography found on their computers 
during police investigations.128
While responding to the defence has proven somewhat challenging, one of the 
more promising responses appears to be in the development of a credible and 
consistent computer forensic analysis that can be easily explained to juries and 
judges.129 In order to address the defence, prosecutors may need to lead evidence 
that no Trojan horses or other viruses were found on the computers of those 
accused.130
Digital networked technologies, then, present certain challenges in terms of 
proving that an accused is in “possession” of impugned materials. Many of these 
challenges necessitate careful consideration when charges are laid and in identifying 
what evidence the prosecution must lead in order to prove its case. The charge of 
“intentionally accessing” child pornography represents one alternative to addressing 
the challenges related to “possession”. Charges relating to intentionally accessing 
child pornography (using, for example, an Internet browser), while averting the need 
for proof of downloading (or partial downloading), still require proof of intention -
127 Alan Phillips, “The Trojan Horse Defence” 7Safe Information Security (January 2005), online: The 
Trojan Horse Defence <http://www.7safe.com/resources/SecurityMatters200501.htm >.
128 “Man Blames Trojan Horse For Child Pornography, Sophos Anti-Virus Reports” Sophos (1 August
2003), online: Man blames Trojan horse for child pornography, Sophos Anti-Virus reports 
<http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/articles/pomtrojan.html>; John Schwartz, “Acquitted Man Says 
Virus Put Pornography on Computer” The New York Times Company (11 August 2003), online: 
Acquitted Man Says Virus Put Pornography on Computer <http://www.mindcontrolforums.com/virus- 
put-pomography-computer.htm>; John Leyden, “Trojan Defence Clears Man on Child Pom Charges” 
The Register (24 April 2003), online: Trojan defence clears man on child pom charges | The Register 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/archive/30385.html>. The Trojan defence has been raised 
unsuccessfully in the U.S. See generally Susan W. Brenner et al., “The Trojan Horse Defense in 
Cybercrime Cases” (2004) 21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1.
129 Megan Camey & Marc Rogers, “The Trojan Made Me Do It: A First Step in Statistical Based 
Computer Forensics Even Reconstruction” Center for Education and Research in Information 
Assurance and Security, Purdue University (2004), online: 2004-15.pdf <http://www.cerias.purdue 
.edu/tools_and_resources/bibtex_archive/archive/2004- 15.pdf>.
130 This was the case in State of Dakota v. McKinney, 699 N.W.2d 460 (S.C.S.D. 2005).
which may be susceptible to challenge in light of the online proliferation of 
pornographic spam.131
«Ï. The “Virtual Image” Defence
In some jurisdictions outside of Canada restrictions on child pornography do not 
apply to virtual child pornography. However, as the U.S. example below 
demonstrates, the absence of restrictions on virtual child pornography can lead to 
practical problems in child pornography prosecutions whether or not the images 
actually involve real children. The United States Supreme Court (USSC) held in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition that restrictions on pornographic images not 
depicting real children unduly infringed freedom of expression and could not 
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.132 As a result, the USSC struck down a federal 
provision that purported to restrict images which were wholly computer generated.133 
The Court found that the physical abuse of real children had been the primary 
justification for its earlier upholding of restrictions on child pornography, and that no 
such justification could be found with respect to wholly computer generated 
images.134
Ashcroft was interpreted to impose a burden on prosecutors of child 
pornography offences to prove: (i) the images in issue were created in their entirety 
with a real child, rather than using digitally created images of children; and (ii) the 
defendant knew the child in the picture was real.135 While prior to Ashcroft the 
virtual image defence was rarely raised and was even more rarely successful, the 
incidence of both raising the defence and achieving a successful result rose following 
the USSC’s decision.1 In 2003, Congress responded to Ashcroft by passing the
131 Code, supra note 2, s. 163.1(4); See Julia Scheeres “Pom Spam: It’s Getting Raunchier” Wired News 
(30 September 2002), online: Wired News: Pom Spam: It’s Getting Raunchier 
<http://www.wired.eom/news/culture/0,1284,55420,00.html>.
132 Ashcroft, supra note 5.
133 Congress later responded by enacting the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation o f Children Today Act o f 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d), 117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003) 
(codified as amended in various sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.) [PROTECT Act]. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 
(8)(B) (Supp. 2003) in particular restricts computer generated images that are virtually 
indistinguishable from a real child. The amended provision was premised on commentary in the 
USSC decision that seemed to suggest that restrictions on extremely realistic representations of 
children may be acceptable. However, the amended provision does not appear to be relied upon 
frequently in child pornography prosecutions.
134 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
135 In U.S. v. Marchand, 308 F. Supp. 2d 498 at 505 (D.N.J. 2004), the New Jersey federal district court 
held that proof of actual knowledge or wilful blindness would be sufficient to satisfy the “knowledge” 
requirement; Kreston, supra note 101 at 49, 53.
136 A search of federal, state, and supreme court cases in Lexis Nexis and Westlaw in the summer of 2005 
indicated that the defence was raised 27 times prior to Ashcroft, supra note 5. The defence was 
successful only once, but it was raised more than 150 times following Ashcroft and met with success 
on 27 occasions. Here, the term “success” includes: (i) situations in which prior judgments were 
vacated and the matter sent back for re-trial (the majority of “successful” cases) (see Audrey Rogers, 
“Playing Hide and Seek: How to Protect Virtual Pomographers and Actual Children on the Internet” 
(2005) 50 Vill. L. Rev. 87 at 92-93 [Rogers]; see e.g. United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522 at 530 (4th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061 at 1063 (11th Cir. 2002); and United States v. 
Hilton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4208 at 19-20 (D. Me. 2003)); (ii) situations where evidence was
PROTECT Act, which requires prosecutors to prove each image in question depicts 
an actual child or that it is indistinguishable from an actual child. After giving 
notice of their intention to raise the defence (including a summary of the evidence to 
be relied upon), accused persons may show either that: (i) the images in issue were 
created using actual people who were not minors at the time of production; or (ii) the 
images in issue were not created using any real child under the age of majority.138 
Whether the virtual image defence has or will significantly affect the successful 
prosecution of online child pornography in the U.S. is a matter of some debate.139 It 
is clear that prosecutorial strategies for addressing the evidentiary requirements 
arising from the defence continue to develop (modifications that are unnecessary in 
jurisdictions such as Canada where statutory prohibitions are aimed at both virtual 
and non-virtual child pornography).140
While obviously not insurmountable, digitized technologies do present 
obstacles for the enforcement and prosecution of offences relating to online child 
pornography that can complicate legal efforts to address it. In terms of the “two 
kinds of people” referred to in this paper’s epigraph, I suggest challenges of these 
types represent incremental changes in the way that society proceeds. They do not, 
in and of themselves, call for a radical re-thinking of our justifications for regulating 
child pornography or whether it makes sense to continue to use law as a tool for 
doing so. However, there are aspects o f digital technologies that may well be 
transformative -  particularly in terms of how we understand the harms of child 
pornography.
2. Transformative Effects
Grappling with what has been referred to here as the “incremental” effects of the 
Internet and digital technologies on law enforcement efforts relating to child
excluded because the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity of the images (see e.g. 
Commonwealth v. Simone, 63 Va. Cir. 216 (2003) and United States v. Sims, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1255 
(U.S. Dist. 2003)); and (iii) some military cases where the member was convicted of a lesser included 
offence such as “service discrediting and prejudicial to good order” (see e.g. United States v. Deal, 
2005 CCA LEXIS 49 (N.M.C.C.A. 2005); United States v. Anderson, 60 M.J. 548, 2004 CCA LEXIS
152 (A.F.C.C.A. 2004)).
137 PROTECT Act, supra note 133; John P. Feldmeier, “Close Enough For Government Work: An 
Examination of Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child 
Pornography Cases” (2003) 30 N.Ky.L. Rev. 205 at 223.
138 Feldmeier, ibid. at 223; PROTECT Act, supra note 133, § 2252A(c)(l)(A)-(B), § 2252A(c)(2).
139 For further discussion, see Feldmeier, ibid., and Rogers, supra note 136. One national survey 
conducted a year after Ashcroft, supra note 5, indicates that the “virtual child” defence was raised in 
40% of the cases handled by the state and local prosecutors who responded to the survey, although 
only 5% of those cases went to trial and only 4% of the survey respondents said their offices were 
pursuing fewer child pornography cases because of the USSC’s ruling. See Wolak, Finkelhor & 
Mitchell, supra note 98 at 22-23.
140 For further details, see Kreston, supra note 101 at 54-61; As McLachlin C.J.C. stated in Sharpe, “with 
the quality o f contemporary technology, it can be very difficult to distinguish a ‘real’ person from a 
computer creation or composite. Interpreting ‘person’ in accordance with Parliament’s purpose of 
criminalizing possession of material that poses a reasoned risk of harm to children, it seems that it 
should include visual works of the imagination as well as depictions of actual people.” Sharpe, supra 
note 3 at para. 38.
pornography is central to the very practical and current concerns about law’s 
continuing efficacy and raison d ’être in light of technological development. 
However, it is not enough to discuss the ways in which the Internet and digital 
technologies make it more difficult to enforce the law, whether because of a growth 
in the number of offences, difficulties associated with identifying offenders, or 
statutory interpretation issues (such as the meaning of “possession”). Analyzing 
online child pornography provides an opportunity for a glimpse at the socially 
transformative effects of technology, requiring us to revisit and perhaps better 
understand four key regulators of human behaviour -  law, architecture, social norms, 
and the market -  as well as their relationship to and interaction with one another.141 
Studying online child pornography brings into sharp relief certain aspects of these 
four behavioural regulators and their inter-relationship, and highlights the very 
limited nature of a singular focus on individuated physical harms.
(A) Regulation o f  Child Pornography before the Internet
Prior to the Internet and to the proliferation of relatively inexpensive digital video 
creation and streaming technologies, the market, technology, and social norms 
placed relatively severe constraints on access to and distribution of child 
pornography. In the pre-Internet era and prior to the proliferation of technologies 
such as digital cameras, scanners and video editing programs, the child pornography 
market was primarily based on the sale of hardcopy materials distributed by mail.142 
As a result, manufacturing and accessing child pornography was expensive and time- 
consuming. In concert with these market and technology-related factors, social 
norms played a significant role in constraining access to and distribution of child 
pornography. Those who took the risks associated with physically going out to find 
or even ordering child pornography in hardcopy by mail risked not only criminal 
charges, but severe and long-term social ostracism as well. As one Internet 
consultant advised:143
Formerly men used to have to remove themselves from their community 
by three levels [to find extreme, violent pornography]. First, they had to 
go somewhere, physically, then know where to go and know how to find 
it. The Web makes it very easy to get that far removed quickly.144
The level of subterfuge necessary to gain access to and distribute hardcopy 
child pornography as well as the social isolation of adults with a known sexual
141 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws o f Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
142 Donna M. Hughes, “The Impact of the Use of New Communications and Information Technologies on 
Trafficking in Human Beings for Sexual Exploitation: A Study of Users” (Paper presented to the 
Council of Europe, May 2001), online: study_of_users <http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes 
/study_of_users> at 6-7 [Hughes, “Trafficking”]. Mail appears to be playing an increasingly reduced 
role in the child pornography market, although some producers who advertise on the Internet continue 
to distribute by mail.
143 The ability to download and save significant quantities of child pornography onto relatively small 
media, such as disks or USB keys has also facilitated easier concealment of possession of child 
pornography than was previously the case in relation to videotapes, magazines, and other hardcopy 
forms. Quayle & Taylor, “Child Pornography and the Internet”, supra note 6 at 355.
144 Hughes, “Sexual Exploitation”, supra note 6 at 139.
interest in children from the broader community, combine to form significant barriers 
to involvement with child pornography. As discussed in Part I above, the law has 
also attempted to play a role in the process of behaviour regulation by prohibiting 
numerous activities relating to child pornography; from possession through to 
production and distribution. In the pre-Internet context, these regulations were 
characterized as justifiable limitations on the free expression of child pornography 
consumers and producers, in light not only of the physical harms occasioned on 
individual children abused in the process of creating child pornography, but also 
based on a reasoned apprehension of risk of future physical harms and, collaterally, 
to reinforce a social norm against viewing children as sexual partners.145
However, prior to the Internet the actual number of child pornography charges 
laid was relatively small.146 The legal justifications for restricting child 
pornography, combined with the relatively small number of charges laid, tended to 
support and reflect a perception of child pornography as a problem associated with 
an isolated group of people who were at risk of sexually assaulting an individual 
child.147 The Internet and digital technologies may well transform this perception, 
compelling us to question the continuing validity of focusing on individuated 
physical harms, pushing us toward a closer examination of the long-term societal 
effects of evermore broad-based commodification of child sexuality and increasingly 
extreme images of child sexual abuse.148
(B) Internet Transformation o f Market, Social, and Technological Regulation
Whereas hardcopy technologies worked along with social norms and market 
characteristics to discourage involvement with child pornography, the Internet and 
the proliferation of other digital technologies appear to be occasioning quite different 
effects. These technologies break down previous market-related barriers by making 
it considerably faster, easier, less expensive, and less risky to access and distribute 
child pornography.149 Access to unprecedented quantities and types of child
145 See Part I, above, for more on this topic.
146 Statistics indicate that only 20 child pornography related charges were laid in 1998, but had increased 
to 159 in 2003. Aucoin, supra note 116 at 5.
147 However, as discussed in Part II above, the categorization o f those at risk of sexually assaulting 
children is not as simple to define or isolate as one might imagine. See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. The tendency toward categorization, while important in terms o f risk 
identification and treatment, may also have had the effect of diverting attention from the broader social 
problem of the commodification of children and their sexuality.
148 The point here is not to deny child sexuality, nor to suggest that child sexuality has not already been 
co-opted as a marketing mechanism. Rather, the point is to illustrate the importance of thinking about 
broader equality impacts of more widespread desensitization to the commodification and exploitation 
of child sexuality that digital technologies appear to risk. In this regard, I am reminded of the shifting 
community standard that members o f one provincial film review board noted had led to acceptance of 
increasingly humiliating and degrading acts by men against women in pornography: Bonnie Sherr 
Klein (director), Not a Love Story: A Film About Pornography, (National Film Board: 1981).
149 The Internet is often said to bring with it the “triple As”: affordability, accessibility, and anonymity. A1 
Cooper et al., “Cybersex Users, Abusers, and Compulsives: New Findings and Implications. A Special 
Issue of the Journal o f Sexual Addiction and Compulsivity” in A1 Cooper, ed., Cybersex. The Dark 
Side of the Force (Philadelphia: Bruner-Routledge, 2000).
pornography at the touch of a button in the privacy of one’s own home appears to be 
generating significant shifts in terms of who is consuming and producing child 
pornography, as well as in how it is being consumed and the content of the material 
itself. 50 Quayle and Taylor note:
King has...argued that it is not the simple availability o f pornography 
online that has created [a need for further study on the impact o f  the 
Internet on sexuality], but the fact that people now have access to types of 
material that were previously available only at great expense and or 
personal risk.151
Although there remains a commercial element in child pornography 
manufacturing and distribution, these technologies facilitate both the sharing and 
trading of child pornography free of charge, as well as its non-commercial 
production.152 In addition, it would appear that a growing proportion of children and 
youths are learning about sexuality through sometimes abusive and exploitative 
online pornography.153 Further, adult males with no prior experience with child 
pornography and no previously recognized sexual interest in children now form part 
of the online consumer group:
It is also evident that while there are people who have a previously 
acknowledged sexual interest in children, for whom the Internet becomes 
a medium for meeting their expressed preferences, there are equally those 
who seem to have had no prior knowledge that the images might be 
sexually arousing for them. In the latter case, we do not know whether 
such ‘dormant’ interests might ever have found expression without the 
Internet.154
Some recent Canadian cases relating to online child pornography seem to 
support these observations. While many men convicted of online child pornography
150 The term “shifts” is used with caution. Earlier studies o f child pornography have tended to focus on 
convicted child sex offenders. It may well be that a much broader demographic was involved in the 
market for child pornography even prior to the advent of the Internet.
151 Storm A. King, “Internet Gambling and Pornography: Illustrative Examples of the Psychological 
Consequences of Communication Anarchy” (1999) 2 CyberPsychology & Behavior 175; Ethel Quayle
& Max Taylor, “Model of Problematic Internet Use in People with a Sexual Interest in Children” 
(2003) 6 CyberPsychology & Behavior 93 at 94 [Quayle & Taylor, “Model o f Internet Use”].
152 Quayle & Taylor, “Child pornography and the Internet”, supra note 6 at 334.
153 Dolf Zillmann, “Influence of Unrestrained Access to Erotica on Adolescents’ and Young Adults’ 
Dispositions Toward Sexuality” (2000) 27 J. Adolescent Health 41; and Ethel Quayle & Max Taylor, 
“Young People Who Sexually Abuse: The Role of the New Technologies” in Marcus Erooga and 
Helen Masson, eds., Children and Young People who Sexually Abuse Others: Current Developments 
and Practice Responses, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006).
154 Quayle & Taylor, “Model of Internet Use”, supra note 151 at 103.
offences meet the relatively strict diagnostic criteria for pedophilia, others do not.155 
Those convicted include men from across the spectrum of occupational categories 
and income levels, some of whom were married with children and considered to be 
upstanding members of their communities.156 At least one offender attempted to 
explain his conduct in terms of addictive behaviours derived from prolonged Internet 
use, claiming that his addiction “blossomed with the advances in computer 
technology and the Internet” because they facilitated an “endless flow” of 
pornographic images to his home computer. We should reject the “computer- 
made-me-do-it” defence as any form of justification for engaging in the exploitation 
of children and their sexuality. Nevertheless, the way in which technology reduces 
the degree of personal risk that might otherwise have previously deterred many 
adults from becoming involved may well compel us to confront more directly the 
broader effects of a more easily accessed trade in child sexuality that appears to 
include increasingly violent images of child sexual abuse.158
While social, market, and technological factors may have worked to keep most 
people from engaging in the offline child pornography trade, it would appear that 
certain aspects of the way in which the online trade in child pornography is 
proceeding could, for some, lead to active and consuming engagement. While many 
begin as one-way consumers of online child pornography by purchasing and 
downloading images for personal sexual gratification, their level of involvement 
often progresses to interaction in a community of other offenders and/or in real-time 
creation of child pornography through online interactions with children. Martin 
Calder notes:
The presence o f complex social structures in the computer underground
indicates that on a social organizational level, adults with a sexual interest
155 The DSM-IV, supra note 68, prepared by the American Psychiatric Association is typically relied 
upon by experts in determining whether an accused should be diagnosed a “pedophile”. Section 302.2 
confines pedophilia to those with lasting, recurring sexual fantasies or sexual urges relating to pre- 
pubescent children, thereby excluding from its scope a considerable number of adults with a sexual 
interest in children. See Lanning, supra note 68; See e.g. R. v. Craig, supra note 67; R. v. Pecchiarich,
[2001] OJ. No. 3940 (S.C.J.); and R. v. Anderson (2005), supra note 67; See e.g. R. v. Carratt, [2005] 
A.J. No. 743 (Prov.Ct. (Crim. Div.)); R. v. Harlos, [2005] A.J. No. 541 (Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div.)); R. v. 
M.L., supra note 91; R. v. Woroby, [2003] M.J. No. 98 (C.A.); R. v. Yaworski, [2000] OJ No 2613; R. 
v. Fulton, supra note 75.
156 See e.g. R. v. Cohen, [2001] OJ No. 1606 (C.A.); R. v. Fulton, ibid. In the context of luring, see R. v. 
Folino, [2005] O.J. No. 4737 (C.A.).
157 R. v. Anderson (2005), supra note 67 at para. 17.
158 Concerns relating to adult sexual interest in children are not new. “[I]n a study by Briere and Runtz 
(1989) non-sex offending college students were asked to fill out a questionnaire regarding their sexual 
attraction to children. Within this study, "21% of the students admitted to sexual attraction to some 
children, 9% described sexual fantasies involving children, 5% admitted to having masturbated to 
those fantasies, and 7% stated there was some likelihood of having sex with a child if detection and 
punishment were unlikely”. Noel Clark, “Sex Offender Treatment Program” Sex Offender Safeguard 
Program (2001), online: Safe Guard Programme -  Sex Offenders in Community based Treatment 
<http://inpsyte.ca/chapter3.html> (quoting John Briere & Marsha Runtz, “University Males' Sexual 
Interest in Children: Predicting Potential Indices of "Pedophilia" in a Non-Forensic Sample” (1989) 13 
Child Abuse & Neglect 65 at 65). However, to the extent that digital technologies provide a lower- 
cost, less personally risky means to express that interest, they open up new questions as to the broader 
social risk o f mainstreaming escalating levels of exploitative imagery and conduct.
in children act as ‘colleagues’. The pictures in themselves act as a form of  
currency, legitimising activity and creating social cohesion.
The sense of online community built around the sexual exploitation of children, 
all while attempting to mutually reaffirm the “rightness” of the activity, is frequently 
founded on the dehumanization of the children abused.160 Many offenders note that 
they did not see the images as involving real children, or reaffirm amongst 
themselves that the images depicted happy, smiling children, rather than children 
being abused.161 Further, some offenders gain satisfaction beyond sexual 
gratification from membership in online communities in that they are able, without 
identifying themselves, to find others with an identity of interest that is too risky to 
express in the offline world.
Granic and Lamey suggested that the Internet has provided people with 
experiences that have led to a reinterpretation o f  society, relationships, and 
the self. This is very relevant for people with a sexual interest in children.
Through the Internet we see a potential change in the offenders’ beliefs, 
values, and cognitive styles, as they act and interact outside o f the confines 
o f a conventional hierarchy. One consequence o f this (and also a 
contributory factor) may be increased risktaking behavior. It is possible 
that such experiences may empower sex offenders, who have otherwise 
felt marginalized within a conventional society.
Membership in these communities also typically requires building credibility 
by showing oneself to be an avid and extensive collector, and sometimes producer, 
of child abuse imagery.163
Credibility and status could be achieved through the size o f the collection 
o f photographs or through the exchange or trade o f new or ‘rare’ material 
such as pictures or text. The latter would consist o f fantasy stories, or talk 
of previous ‘contact activities’. Again, cognitions that supported such 
behavior tended to emphasize the feeling o f importance gained from 
owning and distributing such images, while at the same time equating the 
pictures with more socially desirable commodities, such as works o f art.
159 Calder, supra note 90 at 8 (referring to the study by Max Taylor et al., “Child Pornography, the 
Internet and Offending” (2001) 2 ISUMA: Canadian Journal of Policy Research 94).
160 Hughes, “Trafficking”, supra note 142 at 28.
161 See e.g. R. v. Anderson (2005), supra note 67 at paras. 18-19; Quayle & Taylor, “Child Pornography 
and the Internet”, supra note 10 at 340.
162 Isabela Granic & Alex V. Lamey, “The Self-Organization of the Internet and Changing Modes of 
Thought” (2000) 18 New Ideas in Psychology 107; Quayle & Taylor, “Model of Internet Use”, supra 
note 151 at 103.
163 “Anecdotal evidence suggests that the production of pornographic images for personal use is not 
unusual. However, the production of pornographic images was also seen in the context of trading, 
where having new material to trade facilitated the acquisition of highly desired and preferred other 
images. Within the community of the Internet, having private pictures to trade also brought with it 
status and power within that community.” Quayle & Taylor, “Model of Internet Use”, ibid. at 101
164 Ibid. at 100.
For some, as gaining credibility in the online community becomes increasingly 
important, the commodification of child sexuality, abuse and the dehumanization of 
children become increasingly evident. As two offenders noted:
We were trading pictures.. .kinda like trading baseball cards. [T]here was 
also the thrill in collecting them. You wanted to get complete sets so 
it .. .was kind o f  like stamp collecting as w ell.165
In this atmosphere of commodification and consumption, it is unsurprising that 
offenders may reach satiation with a certain level of child pornography and then 
“progress” to increasingly physically violent images involving younger and younger 
children.166 One Canadian offender noted that over time he built up a tolerance to 
adult pornography, eventually moving on to increasingly physically violent images 
of child sexual abuse. He advised the court, “the more I did it, the harder it had to 
be”.167
In the context of online child pornography, we see quite graphically the ways in 
which regulators o f human behaviour interact. Aspects of Internet communication 
such as anonymity and pseudonymity, along with the proliferation of digital 
recording and editing equipment have transformed key aspects of the market and 
social norms, which had previously worked to limit involvement with child 
pornography. These transformations bring into stark relief disturbing questions 
about troubling perceptions of children and their sexual accessibility among many 
adults who would previously have been perceived as being far-removed from the 
world of “pedophiles” and other child sex offenders, as well as the dehumanizing 
impact of exploitative commodification that extends well beyond individuated 
physical harms.
(C) Legal Transformation and the Concept o f  Harm
These market, social, and technological changes affect the law in both incremental 
and transformative ways. Incrementally, as discussed in Part III, 1(B) above, these 
changes have occasioned new interpretive and enforcement challenges that have 
been addressed to some extent through legislative amendments, such as the addition 
of the offences of “accessing” child pornography and the related offence of luring.168 
However, technological change could also raise important transformational questions 
with respect to the concept of the harms of child pornography previously considered 
foundational to its restriction.169
165 Quayle & Taylor, “Child Pornography and the Internet”, supra note 6 at 342.
166 Calder, supra note 90 at 28.
167 Anderson (2005), supra note 67 at paras. 18-19.
168 See Part III, 1(B), above, for more on this topic.
169 These technological, market, and social norm transformations might also lead us toward questioning 
the expression/conduct distinction that has been central to the conception of child pornography, 
obscenity, and hate propaganda as constitutionally protected “expression”, the restriction of which 
necessitates “proof’ of harm in the first place. In the context of real-time creation of child 
pornography in online chat rooms, which often directly involves child participants, the line between 
the violent “form” and the violent “content” seems increasingly blurrier and perhaps more difficult to 
justify —  a subject I intend to investigate in future writing.
Regardless of the state of the art in creating digital images, the Internet and 
digital technologies such as photo-shopping do nothing to alter the validity of the 
justifications previously offered in support of the Code restrictions on child 
pornography. Images depicting the sexual violation of children, whether they 
include real children, digitally “morphed” children, or completely digitally created 
images of children, still engage the legislative objectives of preventing physical harm 
to children. While digitally altered and completely digitally created images of the 
sexual violation of children need not involve the actual physical violation of a real 
child (like the stories in Sharpe, the paintings in Langer, or the animated images in 
Chin), these types of images would still continue to engage the concerns expressed in 
Sharpe about the risk of future physical harm to children to the extent that they may 
fuel fantasies, reinforce cognitive distortions relating to sexual abuse of children, 
and/or be used for grooming children.170 As McCombs J. noted in Langer.
The evil o f child pornography lies not only in the fact that actual children 
are often used in its production, but also in the use to which it is 
put...Because o f the ways in which child pornography is used by 
paedophiles, the risk o f harm is present whether or not real children are 
used in its creation.171
Two elements of the harms analysis in Sharpe, Langer, and Chin are 
noteworthy in terms of thinking about the social and market transformations wrought 
by the Internet and digital technologies. First, the analysis prioritizes physical harms 
to individual children over broader non-physical harms. In the context of a potential 
future in which increasingly realistic digitally created images of child sexual abuse 
are made possible by technology, we may be entering into an era in which child 
pornography offences will be treated less seriously. Where a real child is not 
actually abused in producing the image, the remaining justifications relate to the 
continuing risk of physical harm (analyzed primarily from the perspective of the 
pedophile) and the much less developed and oft-neglected “incidental” good of 
denouncing the exploitation of children and their sexuality.
If, through technology, we were to arrive at a future in which no child was 
physically harmed in the making of child pornography, should crimes relating to 
child pornography be treated less seriously? I suggest that, even if technology were 
to facilitate such a future, and even if the risk of subsequent sexual offences against 
children following consumption of virtual child pornography were minimal, there 
would nevertheless remain a valid justification for its restriction. Fostering the 
equality and dignity of children in our society demands the legislative expression of 
public disapprobation of the exploitation of children as sexual commodities for the 
on-demand consumptive “pleasure” of others. These should not, as the SCC’s 
reasons in Sharpe suggested, be considered an “incidental” good of restrictions on 
child pornography. Rather, they ought to be viewed as central justifications, which 
should take on renewed significance in light of the technologically-facilitated
170 See Sharpe, supra note 3, for list of potential harms; Langer, supra note 9; Chin, supra note 69; See 
also supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
171 Langer, supra note 9 at paras. 28-29.
communities online that starkly reveal a growing market for human 
commodification. While we have a long way to go in terms of giving real meaning 
to the equality rights of children, restrictions on materials that blatantly market them 
as sexual commodities for others’ gratification, whether virtual or non-virtual, 
remain a worthwhile step in the right direction.172
The transformations brought about by technology also highlight a second 
foundational concern relating to the current legal analysis of the harms of child 
pornography -  the risk of physical harm to a child tends to focus solely on an 
analysis of the behaviour of pedophiles. The analysis seems to rely upon the notion 
that it is primarily pedophiles who are at risk of sexually assaulting children. The 
social science evidence referred to in Part III. 2(B) above reminds us of “situational” 
offenders who sexually assault children not because they have an ongoing sexual 
interest in children, but because the opportunity presents itself.173 Further, as greater 
numbers of those with no previously acknowledged sexual interest in children 
increasingly come into contact with child pornography by virtue of the Internet, 
concerns arise not only relating to impacts on physical offences, but also to the risks 
of more widespread desensitization towards children’s well-being and basic 
humanity:
Quayle (2002) concluded that whilst there is little support for a direct 
causal link [between viewing child pornography and subsequent contact 
offences against children], individuals who are already predisposed to 
sexually offend are most likely to show an effect o f exposure to 
pornography and are the most likely to show the strongest effects....The 
exposure thus influences but does not cause the offending. What appears 
to be clear is that someone accessing child pornographic images will at the 
very least be desensitising themselves and this is a concern in its own 
right.174
The transformation of the market and social norms facilitated by the Internet 
and related technologies could lead us to raise certain foundational questions about 
prior legal analyses of the harms of child pornography. Widespread access to and 
participation in the child pornography trade could have an impact on contact offences 
as more individuals become aware of and find community legitimation for that 
interest. At this stage, we do not know whether these aspects of the online child 
pornography trade will impact the current social science evidence on the link 
between viewing and subsequent contact offences. In any event, we should be 
concerned about the degree to which widespread dissemination and growing 
participation will mainstream and further desensitize members of the broader 
community to the commodification of children and their sexuality -  further
172 In Foundation fo r Children, Youth and the Law, supra note 12, the SCC’s decision in relation to 
corporal punishment in is particularly troubling in this regard. While, on one hand, we restrict child 
pornography purportedly primarily in an effort to minimize the risk of physical harm to children, 
children do not enjoy the fUll protection of the assault provisions of the Criminal Code.
173 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. See also Taylor & Quayle, Internet Crime, supra note 80 at 
12-13.
174 Calder, supra note 90 at 17, referring to Quayle & Taylor, “Child Pornography and the Internet”, supra 
note 6.
undermining their place and status within our society. As the Special Committee on 
Pornography and Prostitution concluded:
[T]here are magazines, films and videos produced solely for the purpose 
of entertainment whose depiction o f women in particular, but also, in 
some cases, men and young people, demeans them, perpetuates lies about 
aspects o f their humanity and denies the validity o f their aspirations to be 
treated as full and equal citizens within the community.175
Broadening the analysis of harm to more directly take into account the 
collective harms of the child pornography trade is consistent with the SCC’s analysis 
in the hate speech context and recognizes the role that harmful expression has 
historically played in paving the way for attitudinal changes essential to longer-term 
discriminatory acts and ultimately, in some cases, to acts of physical violence against 
target groups. As Dickson C.J.C. noted:
The threat to the self-dignity o f target group members is thus matched by 
the possibility that prejudiced messages will gain some credence, with the 
attendant result o f discrimination and even violence against minority 
groups in Canadian society.176
CONCLUSION
The project of the paper was to suggest that thinking of technological developments 
as presenting either incremental or transformative challenges is unrealistically 
dichotomous. Examination of the issue of online child pornography suggests that the 
Internet and related digital technological developments present both incremental and 
transformative change. Perhaps more importantly, the examination suggests that we 
proceed cautiously with any assumption that transformational change necessarily 
requires us to abandon existing legal regulation and the values underlying it. While 
transformational change may present an opportunity for fresh thinking about what 
else may be at stake in the context subject to regulation, it may also serve to reaffirm 
“old” commitments.
Incrementally, the Internet and related digital technologies have facilitated 
expansion of the child pornography market by easing access and lowering the costs 
of production and distribution. These aspects of the market have raised public 
awareness of child pornography as a social problem, stimulating calls for legal 
responses at the local, national, and international levels. Reinvigorated enforcement 
efforts, however, have met with numerous challenges that in some cases have led to 
legislative reform, including the addition of the “accessing” offence and related 
luring provisions. In other cases, these challenges have necessitated revised 
enforcement and prosecutorial strategies to address identification issues associated 
with online anonymity and pseudonymity, as well as (in the U.S. context) the 
complications of the virtual image defence. While provoking incremental changes in
175 Department of Justice, Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Report o f the Special Committee on 
Pornography and Prostitution, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Communications and Public Affairs, Dept, of Justice, 
1985) at 103 (the “Fraser Report”), cited by Gonthier J. in Butler, supra note 13 at 514.
176 R. v. Keegstra, supra note 16.
legislation and in enforcement and prosecution strategy, certain aspects of these and 
other challenges may also prove to be transformative -  relating to the foundational 
aspects of our justifications for regulating and of our legal approaches to child 
pornography offences.
By destabilizing social norms and market constraints that previously acted to 
curb involvement with child pornography, the Internet and related technologies are 
bringing into stark relief questions about the risks of widespread child sexual 
commodification, including increasingly extreme images of child sexual abuse. In so 
doing, these technologies challenge us to expand the focus of concern justifying 
restrictions on child pornography beyond physical harms to individual children. As 
technology leads us down a road toward increasingly realistic digitally created 
virtual child pornography that need not involve abuse of real children in its making, 
we confront more directly the effect of widespread commodification of children and 
their sexuality on children’s collective equality and dignity interests. These broader 
collective interests, once referred to by the SCC as an “incidental” good of 
restrictions on child pornography, are likely to take on increasing importance in 
terms of the constitutional justifications for those restrictions.
Unlike most hate propaganda, much non-virtual child pornography is produced 
through physical assaults on real human beings. Eliminating these physical harms is 
and ought to remain a central focus of restrictions on child pornography. However, 
like all hate propaganda, both virtual and non-virtual child pornography spreads a 
message that undermines the humanity of its targets by converting them and their 
sexuality into commodities for exploitation, discrimination and abuse. Taking a 
public stand against these broader social harms ought also to be seen as a central 
focus of restrictions on child pornography. Technological change may lead us 
towards this transformation; toward recognition that child pornography, like other 
forms of hate speech:
harms the individual who is the target; .. .perpetuates negative stereotypes 
[and] promotes discrimination by...creating an atmosphere o f fear, 
intimidation [and] harassment.214
In the context of child pornography, breaking this kind of cycle could play an 
important role in fostering equality for children and ought to be recognized as more 
than an “incidental” good of its legal restriction.
214 Lederer & Delgado, supra note 86 at 4-5.
